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PUBLISHER:
Colonel Steven P. Noonan, MSC, CD

EDITORIAL STAFF:
Editor-in-Chief:  Lieutenant-Colonel Victor A. McPherson, CD
Senior Editor:  Major (Retired) J.J.L. Serge Pelletier, CD

Our sincere thanks to Mrs. Lisa Moulton, CD (Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre) for her contribution as copy editor.

PRODUCTION MANAGER:
Major (Retired) J.J.L. Serge Pelletier, CD

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CFJP 01

Foreword

01. *Canadian Military Doctrine* (CFJP 01) is the Canadian Forces (CF) capstone doctrine publication and is published under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff. This manual specifies the roles and missions assigned to the CF; describes the fundamentals of warfare; provides guidance for command, control and organization of the CF, authorized command relationships and the authorities that military commanders can use; and formulates guidelines for operational activities embodied in strategic policy. CFJP 01 also provides the CF doctrinal basis for interdepartmental and interagency action in the rapidly emerging concepts of whole of government operations and the comprehensive approach strategy.

02. The nature of the defence and security challenges Canada faces and their impact on our strategic interests require the CF to contribute to Canada’s defence and security as a joint and integrated force within a Defence and whole of government team. Military operations will take place at home and abroad and may be conducted with the military forces of allies and coalition partners as well. Further, operations in support of Canadian and foreign government departments and agencies, provincial and local governments, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations will remain the norm. While this manual does not serve as an authority on whole of government operations, nor the comprehensive approach strategy, the guidance contained in *Canadian Military Doctrine* serves as the foundation for the development and refinement of those emerging doctrines; it serves as an authoritative reference for how the CF will plan and execute operations, and how the CF will act as a joint and integrated force—from the strategic to tactical levels—all with a view to creating military effects that support our nation’s defence and security needs and Government of Canada objectives.

03. Successful operations result in the maintenance or re-establishment of peace and security, or in conditions that enable those strategic objectives. These results are made possible through the planning and conduct of land, air, maritime, special, space, and cyber operations, all nested within an operational and strategic operations framework that include, but are not necessarily limited to, command and control; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; information operations; interagency operations; and operational sustainment. This manual is well grounded in the fundamentals of the planning and conduct of land, air, maritime, and special operations, but has yet to fully account for the rapidly developing space and cyber domains, and the operational and strategic level operations and systems within which all these are nested. Nevertheless, their doctrinal foundation, and the driving CF principles within which these will emerge are found herein. In the end, the CF’s mission and vision provide the persistent purpose for what the CF does, and methods the force will employ to do it. Developing, generating, and operating as a joint, integrated, interagency, and multinational operations capable force is a persistent theme in *Canadian Military Doctrine*.

04. The key to being a learning organization is the development and inculcation of a body of unifying doctrine that leads the development of the CF at large through our capability development, professional development and training regimens. As well, having a codified body of doctrine provides the vehicle for change that is derived from feedback from lessons learned and new inputs from emerging concept and capability development efforts. This first publication of *Canadian Military Doctrine* is a key element in supporting ongoing transformation, in guiding the overall professional
development of our leaders, and in establishing a capstone publication that can be changed deliberately based on what we discover and what we learn. Doctrine is only as useful as its implementation. This publication must be the foundation for all CF operational doctrine, for the teaching and study of the military art, for the application of military power in operations, and for focusing our approach as a learning organization.

05. This publication is ready for general implementation across the Canadian Forces. It is also ready for adaptation as we discover and learn.

S.A. Beare  
Major-General  
for Chief of the Defence Staff
Preface

01. **Aim.** The aim of this manual is to provide strategic guidance for CF doctrine.

02. **Policy context.** This publication has been harmonized with Government of Canada defence policy and allied capstone doctrine documents.

03. **Content overview.** This manual is divided as follows:
   
a. **Chapter 1 – Canadian Military Doctrine.** Sets the stage for CF doctrine by providing a description of concept and purpose, strategic levels, types, application, hierarchy and interoperability.

b. **Chapter 2 – Generation and Application of Military Power.** Lays out the Canadian philosophy for the employment of the CF as an instrument of national power.

c. **Chapter 3 – Strategic Framework.** Discusses the methodology for a CF high-level strategy and the application of that strategy in cooperation with our major allies.

d. **Chapter 4 – The Canadian Forces.** Describes the guiding principles, core military values, ethos and expectations of military service. This chapter also provides a brief overview of the CF defence mission and roles.

e. **Chapter 5 – Command and Control.** Opens with the CF philosophy for command and control and provides a brief description of the CF organization. It closes with command and control within coalition and allied operations.

f. **Chapter 6 – Canadian Approach to Operations.** Provides a general overview of the operational philosophy and describes considerations for joint and combined operations. This chapter also includes a description of the CF approach to specific operations.

04. Recommendations for amendments to this publication are welcomed and should be forwarded to the Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, attention Joint Doctrine Branch.

05. The Chief Force Development is the approval authority for this document.
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Chapter 1
Canadian Military Doctrine

Introduction

0101. This publication—Canadian Military Doctrine—outlines the strategic military doctrine of the Canadian Forces (CF) and the Canadian approach to operations. The CF doctrine is based upon a long and proud history of service to Canada and enduring principles that have been developed and tested over time. Combined with a rigorous analysis of the emerging concepts and trends that will shape the future security environment, Canadian Military Doctrine provides the military strategic guidance essential for the development and the employment of the full range of CF capabilities across the spectrum of operations in response to government direction.

0102. Canadian Military Doctrine describes the relationship between the CF and the Government of Canada, more specifically:

a. national security and strategic policy applicable to the CF;

b. the constitutional, political, legal, and administrative context within which Canada may use military power;

c. the application of military power within Canada and the North American continent for domestic purposes;

d. the manner in which the CF is organized and prepared to conduct operations; and

e. the nature of conflict and evolving geo-political issues that influence Canadian international policy.

The concept and purpose of doctrine

0103. Doctrine is a body of knowledge and thought that provides direction and aids understanding. The CF definition of doctrine is “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”\(^1\) It embraces established wisdom in the areas of problem solving, decision making and planning, and is sometimes defined as simply “what is taught.”

0104. Military doctrine provides the framework within which military operations are planned and executed. It represents the distilled insights and wisdom gained from experience. Doctrine is developed in the context of contemporary and emerging factors that influence the way that Canada intends to use military force. By building on lessons learned with an understanding of the future, military doctrine provides the rationale behind the organization and the employment of military forces and assists in the

determination of appropriate roles and missions. A sound doctrinal framework provides the basis for operations and training, guides commanders and helps individuals to think more clearly in the fog of war.

0105. Military doctrine provides a common approach to the conduct of military arts and science based upon methodical thinking that is not bound by prescriptive rules. When combined with effective training, doctrine does not constrain individual initiative; rather it leads to consistent behaviour, mutual confidence and effective collective action. Well-developed military doctrine is inherently flexible, allowing commanders to seize the initiative and adopt unorthodox or imaginative courses of action as opportunities arise in the “battlespace.”

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The original Canadian military doctrine

Impressed by his experience with indigenous peoples, Governor General de La Barre appointed Hertel de La Fresnière commander of the allied Amerindian nations. It was at this time that his real military exploits began, based above all on his revolutionary concept of the art of war.

Hertel believed that the only way to fight effectively in North America was to adopt the tactics of the natives and unite them with European discipline. Canadian soldiers serving in corps on raids assumed much more independence and individual responsibility than their European colleagues marching mechanically into battle row on row, to the sound of beating drums. In Canada, Hertel believed that it was necessary to move quickly in small groups; to approach the enemy without being seen, like scouts; to surprise him, and then to disappear immediately. This was the classic surprise attack of the Amerindians, reinforced by perfect coordination and thoughtful discipline. Combatants were expected to think quickly rather than reacting “automatically” as in Europe, which is too often thought to be the only kind of military discipline. Commanders, for their part, directed not homogeneous armies but forces with considerable differences in discipline and culture, since they included professional officers, French soldiers, Canadian militiamen and Amerindian allies. The commanders' ability to reconcile the strengths of these people and focus them all on the desired outcome became a factor of prime importance. Finally, retreats had to be rapid and well planned, so that enemy forces could not pursue closely, but at most only follow the footprints. This was a major difference, because if the enemy was in hot pursuit, a race ensued with perpetual harassment. However, if withdrawal was rapid, the enemy had to follow at a distance, providing enough time to lay a murderous trap, which might discourage him from continuing. These, then, were the basic principles that enabled Canadians to gain victory after victory, seizing vast tracts of territory from other European nations who also hoped to establish hegemony in America.

—Canadian Military Heritage

Levels of doctrine

0106. CF military doctrine is divided into three levels, each of which is applicable to both joint and environment-specific doctrine i.e. strategic, operational, and tactical (see Figure 1-1).

a. **Strategic doctrine.** Strategic doctrine sets out the most fundamental and enduring principles that guide the use of military forces across the continuum of operations.
Strategic doctrine is the foundation of all military doctrine and establishes the framework for the effective use of force.

b. **Operational doctrine.** Operational doctrine applies the principles of strategic doctrine to military actions by describing the use of armed forces in the context of distinct objectives, force capabilities, generic mission types and operating environments. Operational doctrine describes the organizations necessary for the effective employment of military forces.

c. **Tactical doctrine.** Tactical doctrine applies the principles of operational doctrine when disposing naval, land, aerospace and special operations forces in actual contact with the enemy. The tactical level is concerned with planning and directing military resources in battles, engagements and/or activities within a sequence of major operations to achieve operational objectives.

**Types of doctrine in the CF**

![Levels of Doctrine Diagram]

0107. **Environment-specific doctrine** is doctrine that is specific to an environment (i.e. maritime, land, and aerospace forces). Environmental doctrine has distinct characteristics and applications and provides complementary contributions to national and multinational military operations. The Environmental chiefs of staff (ECSs) are responsible for the generation and the maintenance of their respective doctrine.

0108. **Joint doctrine** provides the fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces from two or more environments in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint doctrine describes the best way to integrate and employ maritime, land, and aerospace forces in unified action towards a single operational objective. The CF is constituted under royal charter as a single entity. When elements of two or more environments of the CF are required to operate in the same theatre or area of operations in pursuit of the same strategic objective, they may operate under a joint command structure.

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2 The Canadian Forces are the armed forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of one service called the Canadian Armed Forces (*NDA, Part II, 14*). The maritime, land, and air elements of the CF are formally referred to as "environments."
To accomplish this, the CF has developed joint doctrine to serve as guidance for the organization and the employment of joint forces.

0109. **Combined doctrine** is military doctrine that describes the best way to integrate and deploy national forces with the forces of allies in coalition or alliance operations. Combined doctrine supports mutual defence treaties, agreements or organizations, and establishes the principles, organization, and fundamental procedures for alliance or coalition operations. For Canada, the most important example of combined doctrine is North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) doctrine. As a member of NATO, Canada is both obliged to follow NATO doctrine during NATO operations and is involved in the continual development and ratification of NATO doctrine.

**The application of strategic doctrine**

0110. The primary function of strategic doctrine is to guide the use of armed forces as an instrument of national power. A secondary function is to assist in shaping perceptions within the Government of Canada (GoC) and the CF about the use of military capabilities as an instrument of national power. CF doctrine is subordinate to Canadian law and GoC policies.

0111. Strategic doctrine is based on lessons learned over time about the ways in which military forces can be used effectively to support national policy. A thorough understanding of how the CF operates is essential to commanders and staff at all levels. Strategic doctrine, therefore, must form the basis of military training and education at all levels of war, not only at institutions dedicated to the professional development of officers.

**The hierarchy of CF doctrine**

0112. For purposes of doctrine development and approval, CF doctrine publications are grouped in three categories of publications: capstone, keystone, and supporting doctrine. Detail on these groupings and doctrine development processes can be found at *Doctrine Development Manual* (CFJP A1). The hierarchical relationship of this capstone publication to other CF doctrine publications is illustrated in Annex A and is further detailed in the * Doctrine Development Manual*.

**Doctrinal interoperability with allies**

0113. To facilitate interoperability, CF strategic, operational, and tactical doctrine must be consistent with the doctrine of our principal allies and alliances. In this regard, the CF actively participates in the development and ratification of combined doctrine within NATO. In addition, due to similarities in force structures and the strong probability that Canada will participate in coalition operations, Canada is an active participant in doctrine development with the armed forces of the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Australia (AUS), and New Zealand (NZ). These relationships ensure that CF doctrine is compatible with the joint and combined doctrine of NATO and the “five eyes” community.

0114. In the event that there are inconsistencies between the doctrine of NATO and our principal allies, the following order of precedence will be used to achieve the greatest possible degree of interoperability:

a. NATO doctrine;
b. Canada, US, UK, AUS, and NZ multilateral doctrine;
c. national doctrine of other NATO member states; and
d. other doctrine, as applicable.
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Annex A
The Hierarchy of CF Doctrine

NOTE: Canadian Military Doctrine tops the hierarchy of CF doctrine publications and as such is the capstone doctrine publication. Doctrine immediately below the capstone level is referred to as keystone doctrine. See CFJP A1, Doctrine Development Manual, for the complete hierarchy.

Figure 1A-1: Hierarchy of CF Doctrine
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Chapter 2
Generation and Application of Military Power

The highest type of strategy—sometimes called grand strategy—is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that resort to war is either unnecessary or undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.

—E.M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, 1944

Instruments of national power

0201. The successful application of national power lies in determining and utilizing the most appropriate mix of the instruments of national power to achieve a desired outcome or end state. The principal instruments of national power are:

a. **Diplomatic.** Diplomacy is “the management of international relations by negotiation.”3 It is the first and most important instrument in seeking to avoid or limit hostilities and will continue even after the commencement of conflict. Diplomacy is dependent on the power of persuasion, i.e. convincing others to take actions that allow for the successful prosecution of a nation’s foreign policy. Principally through their role in deterrence and coercion, armed forces play a major part in diplomacy, and provide resources to counter hostility, build and maintain trust, and assist in international development.

b. **Informational.** Information itself is a strategic resource vital to pursuing national interests. The informational instrument of national power has a diffuse and complex set of components with no single centre of control. Decision making at the national strategic level is increasingly dependent on a reliable and real-time flow of relevant information. Military operations, in particular, are dependent on many simultaneous activities, relying on timely flow and dissemination of information to aid real-time effective decision making. Information readily available from multiple sources influences domestic and foreign audiences including citizens, adversaries, and governments.

c. **Military.** Military power is applied as appropriate to achieve national objectives. Military power is normally used only as a means of last resort when other instruments of national power have failed, or are at risk of failing, to protect national interests.

d. **Economic.** The economic instrument of national power is multi-faceted and may be used in a variety of ways. Liberal or restrictive trade policies can open up or deny markets while the provision of foreign aid can be used to entice nations to behave in certain ways. Specific economic activities in support of national objectives may include disruption of

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trade, withdrawal of aid, or direct economic sanctions. The instrument of economics may require the application of military force to give it effect, as in the case of sanction enforcement operations.

0202. The instruments of national power should not be used in isolation. Their application must be coordinated and appropriate to achieve desired end states. Within the context of national strategy, a nation employs those aspects of national power necessary to achieve the objectives of national policy. In order to be successful, there must be a coordinated and coherent approach to the development of national strategy and the application of the instruments of national power. This approach involves coordination across many national government departments and agencies and is often referred to as a “Whole of Government (WoG) Approach.”

The role of military forces

0203. Defence is a legitimate function of every state. The inherent right of self-defence under international law is enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This right includes the right of collective defence that is embodied in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Defence can be achieved through either deterrence or coercion.

0204. Military forces are primarily used in conjunction with the other instruments of national power as a measure of last resort. This normally occurs only when the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments are not sufficient to realize the strategic goals. Military forces can also be used in situations short of war to achieve limited national or international objectives.

0205. Military forces in democracies are subordinate to the elected civil authority and are prohibited from operating outside the bounds of jurisdiction set by that authority. In addition to combat operations, they are often used for domestic missions such as search and rescue, assistance to other government departments and agencies, aid to civil power, and for disaster relief operations both at home and abroad. However, despite the inherent flexibility and domestic utility of modern military forces, their raison d’être remains armed conflict. This distinction separates military forces from other security arms of the government such as police and border patrol.

0206. Small and medium-size powers are often unable to maintain the full range of military capabilities. Maintaining effective and cohesive fighting forces, however, indicates to others that a nation is serious about deterring aggressive action by other states and enforcing national sovereignty as well as protecting its national interests abroad. To further project influence and ensure that national interests are taken seriously internationally, small and medium states often act collectively, either in coalitions or through the establishment and maintenance of alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This enables them to contribute collectively to military operations thereby substantively contributing to international peace and security.

Deterrence and coercion

0207. Deterrence can be used at all levels of war to defend national interests. At the centre of deterrence is the military preparedness of the nation and the overt willingness to use military power such that an adversary decides that the risk of carrying out a particular course of action is not worth the potential consequences. Deterrence supports the diplomatic, informational, and economic activities and may help to prevent escalation once a conflict has begun.
0208. Coercion is a corollary of, and very similar concept to, deterrence. Whereas the purpose of deterrence is to persuade others not to take a particular course of action against a state, coercion seeks to persuade others to do something that may not be in their particular national interest. There is sufficient overlap between deterrence and coercion that it is extremely difficult to determine the exact method of persuasion to be applied, and a combination of the two is often required. As with deterrence, coercion is relevant at all levels of war.

0209. Deterrence and coercion are the raison d’être for military forces, however, neither necessarily requires the application of lethal force. Deterrence and coercion are tools to persuade an adversary to behave in a manner consistent with Canadian interests and they are therefore an important corollary to the other instruments of national power. The ability to deter or coerce with real effect is the essence of the utility of the instrument of military power. The vital underpinnings of deterrence and coercion are their credibility and capacity to convert threat into application.

Military power

0210. Military power is the potential of the military capabilities that a nation possesses, and the international reputation those capabilities have as professional fighting forces. The employment of military power within a comprehensive approach\(^4\) framework is rapidly becoming the norm at all levels of war, from the strategic to the tactical level. The individual elements of military power must therefore be more interactive and complementary in order to ensure success in meeting the aims and objectives of national strategy.

0211. The overall concept of military power can be viewed as an essential mix of interrelated components: conceptual, moral, and physical. The conceptual component provides the thought process required to develop, generate, and employ military power. This component contains aspects such as: the principles of war, doctrine, and a conceptual framework of capabilities. The moral component is concerned with the persuasion of people to fight and recognizes that it is people who realize military power. This component contains aspects such as: CF culture, morale, leadership, and effective management. The physical component is the actual means to fight and includes elements such as: manpower, equipment, organizational structures, training, force readiness, force generation, and sustainment. The components of military power overlap and are combined to create the overall military potential of a nation as depicted in Figure 2-1.

\(^4\) A collaborative process that includes all actors that may affect the conduct of operations within a joint operating area. These actors may include: military (joint and multi-national forces), Canadian government department and agencies (whole of government), foreign governments and international organizations (e.g. NATO and UN), and publicly funded organizations (e.g. NGOs).
War should be made methodically, for it should have a definite object; and it should be conducted according to the principles and rules of the art.

—Napoleon I, *Maxims of War*, 1831

The conceptual component of military power

War should be made methodically, for it should have a definite object; and it should be conducted according to the principles and rules of the art.

—Napoleon I, *Maxims of War*, 1831

The principles of war

0212. The guiding principles for the conduct of warfare are embodied in principles that were first put forward by Karl von Clausewitz in 1832 and are still valid today across the continuum of operations. In Canadian military doctrine, there are ten “principles of war” that govern the application of military power. The effective application of these principles forms the fundamentals of military operations and must be understood by commanders and staffs at all levels. The ten principles are:

a. **Selection and maintenance of the aim.** Every military operation must have a single, attainable, and clearly defined aim that remains the focus of the operation. While the
The ultimate aim in conflict and war is to break the enemy’s will to fight, operations at every level must have a more limited aim that is clear, simple, and direct. This aim is selected through careful study and analysis of the assigned mission and the desired outcome. Once the aim is selected, it must be maintained; any distraction from it will lead to waste of effort and, ultimately, failure. Should the mission change or be modified, the aim itself will likely have to be adjusted. This first principle is the most important one, as success ultimately depends on the accuracy of selection and adherence to the aim.

b. **Maintenance of morale.** After leadership, morale is the most important element in ensuring cohesion and the will to win. Morale is, however, sensitive to material conditions and should never be taken for granted. It is nurtured through good leadership, sound discipline, realistic training, confidence in equipment, and a sense of purpose.

c. **Offensive action.** Offensive action is required in order to defeat an opponent and is the necessary forerunner of success. Offensive action may be delayed, but until the initiative is seized and the offensive taken, success is unlikely. Distinct advantage lies with the offence because it confers the initiative, gives freedom of action, and compels the enemy to be reactive rather than proactive.

d. **Security.** Security protects the cohesion of a force and other elements of its combat power. During operations it serves to guard vulnerabilities and protect vital interests. In the case of operations security (OPSEC), the protection of information must be assured at all times, not just during the conduct of operations. Security further provides the freedom of action to achieve objectives as well as preventing the enemy from gaining an unexpected advantage. Security does not, however, imply undue caution and avoidance of risks, as bold action is essential to success in war.

e. **Surprise.** Surprise has an effective and powerful influence in war and its effect on morale is immeasurable. Every effort must be made to surprise the enemy and to guard against being surprised. Surprise can produce results out of all proportion to the effort expended and, when other factors are unfavourable, surprise may be essential to success. Surprise can be achieved strategically, operationally, or tactically. The elements of surprise are: secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity, and speed.

f. **Concentration of force.** In order to achieve success in war, it is essential to concentrate superior force, both moral and materiel, at a decisive time and place. Concentration does not necessarily imply a massing of forces, but rather having them disposed in a manner that permits them to combine quickly to create an advantage and deliver a decisive blow, or to counter an enemy threat, when and where required.

g. **Economy of effort.** Economy of effort requires that minimum means and resources be expended or employed in areas other than where the main effort against the enemy is intended to take place. The acceptance of prudent risks in these areas is required in order to gather an effective concentration of combat power at the decisive time and place. This does not imply using minimum force. Judicious expenditure of resources and balanced employment of forces are the keys to this principle.
h. **Flexibility.** Modern warfare demands a high degree of flexibility so that plans can be altered to meet changing situations and unexpected developments. Commanders must be prepared to alter plans to take advantage of chance opportunities or to shift points of effort. Flexibility requires good training, discipline, communications, initiative, and, above all, agility of mind and decisive commanders at all levels. Highly agile forces are also required so they can be concentrated rapidly and economically at the desired time and place.

i. **Cooperation.** Cooperation is a function of cohesion. To achieve maximum synergy and output from the whole of the force involved, aims must be unified, team spirit must be built, interoperability must be instilled, responsibility must be divided, and effort must be coordinated. The increased interdependence of individual environments and their increasing mutual dependence on the armed forces of allies have made cooperation vitally important in modern warfare. Cooperation with other government departments and agencies and non-governmental organizations within the area of operations is also necessary.

j. **Administration.** No plan or operation can succeed without adequate administrative and logistical support. Scarce resources and critical materiel must be controlled at the appropriate level of command, and the administrative organization must be flexible enough to react quickly to changes. The most economic and effective use of materiel is required at all times.

0213. These principles of war are not rigid laws, but they are derived from hard-won lessons learned and provide valuable guidance upon which military action should be based. The mere application of the principles does not guarantee success—circumstances will dictate the relative importance of each and, in some situations, a commander will be able to adhere to one principle only at the expense of another. The challenge is to know where to place the emphasis at any given moment. Commanders must recognize, however, that disregarding the principles of war involves risk and could ultimately lead to failure.

0214. The principles of war as described above, apply to all CF operations. However, due to the likelihood that elements of the CF will be combined with elements of another nation in an alliance or coalition, CF commanders must also be aware of slight differences in the definition and use of the principles of war by NATO\(^5\) and key allies, particularly the US Armed Forces.\(^6\)

**Doctrine**

0215. The role of doctrine within the conceptual component of military power is to provide a framework within which operations are planned, executed, and evaluated. This framework is measured

\(^5\) NATO uses principles for joint and multinational operations, within which there are some definitional differences from the CF’s principles of war. NATO acknowledges that the principles are not absolute and that nations may place greater emphasis on some rather than others, but there is common agreement among member states on their importance and relevance. See AJP-01(C) Allied Joint Doctrine, Ch. 2, Sect. IV.

\(^6\) The American military utilizes a slightly different list of principles, designed to provide the basis for the fundamentals of joint warfare and for the armed services to develop their respective doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. The American principles are: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, manoeuvre, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity.
against the perceived future security environment in order to make recommendations on potential changes to future capability development for the CF. Doctrine is therefore complementary to conceptual thinking and one of the major departure points of the force development process.

Conceptual thinking

0216. The Government’s Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) defines the roles for the CF and identifies the military capabilities required to meet these roles. The Strategic Capability Investment Plan (SCIP)\textsuperscript{7} assists the Department of National Defence in implementing the CFDS in balancing resources across the four capability pillars: personnel, equipment, readiness, and infrastructure. The SCIP is supported by a capability-based planning (CBP) process, which ensures that the CF has the correct mix of capabilities.\textsuperscript{8} It does not focus on a particular environment or equipment but rather on the military capabilities that are required to achieve specific effects and ultimately strategic end states.

0217. The CBP process uses a conceptual capability framework that categorizes specific capabilities within six capability domains (Command, Sense, Act, Shield, Sustain, and Generate). Each capability domain contains the capabilities depicted in Table 2-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>Command support, communications, joint effects targeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense</td>
<td>Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act</td>
<td>Aerospace effects production, land effects production, maritime effect production, special operations effects production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shield</td>
<td>Force protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustain</td>
<td>Sustainment, support services, movements, theatre activation and deactivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate</td>
<td>Force generation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2-1: Capabilities (by Domain)

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\textsuperscript{7} National Defence Strategic Capability Investment Plan Issue 1, November 2003

\textsuperscript{8} Capability is generated through an appropriate combination of PRICIE components (Personnel; Research and Development/Operational Research; Infrastructure and Organization; Concepts, Doctrine and Collective Training; IT Infrastructure; Equipment, Supplies and Services) that enables the creation of effects.
The moral component of military power

0218. The moral component of military power is the capacity to persuade people to take effective action and depends on good morale as well as the conviction that a nation’s purpose is morally and ethically sound. These key elements promote an offensive spirit and a determination to achieve the aim.

0219. The moral component provides the cultural and ethical base from which is derived morale, cohesion, esprit de corps, and fighting spirit. The cultural influence is largely intangible yet vital. The cultural influence is derived from the tradition and history of the CF, each of the environments, and the formation or unit to which an individual belongs or is affiliated. A culture that is clearly aligned with the core values of the CF and respective environments is the best way to foster and build an individual’s emotional attachment to the CF.

0220. A sense of purpose is achieved when that belief is directly linked to involvement of the individual in its pursuit. Involvement is a stronger source of motivation for most people when they feel themselves to be part of a team, all members of which provide the others with support. In military units, given the challenges inherent in war, the need is to go beyond mere team building, to develop genuine comradeship that will endure even as the violence and fear of war, death, and injury begin to root deep into an individual’s consciousness. It is a pride in belonging, best described by the term “esprit de corps” in relation to unit identity but which, at a higher level, includes a belief in a patriotic duty. Being highly motivated in peacetime is one thing; to retain that motivation in the face of battle requires a profoundly deep commitment to one’s country, one’s comrades, one’s unit, and to the cause for which one is fighting.

The physical component of military power

0221. The physical component of military power is the means to fight and is composed of five elements:

a. Personnel. The service men and women that comprise the CF, both regular and reserve components, are highly trained and skilled professionals. They go through a rigorous
selection and initial training process that gives an essential grounding for further professional development and collective training necessary to turn them into effective combatants. The CF has been involved in numerous large- and small-scale military operations since the Second World War and has accumulated a wealth of experience. Many veterans of these operations are still serving. Their skills need to be nurtured, developed, retained, and enshrined in military training, to ensure that the CF continues to remain in high regard both at home and internationally.

b. **Equipment.** A fundamental part of military power is the procurement of the best and most effective equipment that can be afforded, the aim being to maintain a technological advantage that represents a war-winning capability over adversaries. The conceptual component of military power includes the development of concepts to guide Canada’s equipment acquisition program and to develop military power into the future. It is essential that those in the defence industries understand the Canadian approach to military operations in order that they can better anticipate future CF equipment needs. Equally, interaction with industry enables the CF to achieve a better understanding of the capabilities that might be employed by potential adversaries and procure appropriate countermeasures.

c. **Collective performance.** Collective performance can only be achieved through the understanding of common doctrine and the conduct of collective training and exercises, which sharpen the ability to apply military power. Commanders must devise ways of ensuring that the forces under their command are adequately prepared for the demands of war and have the ability to deploy prepared to engage successfully in combat operations.

d. **Readiness.** By their nature, crises occur unexpectedly in equally unexpected places. This leads to the establishment of timelines that are most likely to be short. The Government’s strategic guidance lists national priorities, which subsequently lead to the establishment of readiness criteria for the CF. The actual criteria are articulated as part of policy, not doctrine, but all commanders have the responsibility to meet these established readiness levels from a doctrinal imperative.

e. **Sustainability.** Sustaining military forces in war is as vital a function as the ability to deliver firepower. As soon as an operation begins, events dictate further demands on the force such that it cannot be assumed that a campaign plan will survive the first encounter with the enemy. For this reason, the ability to sustain operations is vital.

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War is not only chameleon-like in character, because it changes its colours in some degree in each particular case, but it is also, as a whole, in relation to the predominant tendencies that are in it, a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play and probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to reason.

—Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 1832
The dimensions of modern conflicts

Modern conflict

0222. Relations between different peoples exist in either a state of peace, conflict, or war. Peace exists when there is an absence of violence or the threat of force. Conflict and war exists when violence is either threatened or manifested. The object of war is to impose one’s will upon the enemy to achieve a defined end state. The means to that end is the coordinated employment of the various instruments of national power including diplomatic, economic, and political efforts, as well as the application, or threat, of violence by military force.

0223. Much of the understanding of the nature of conflict has been derived from the seminal work of individuals such as Sun Tzu, Karl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett, and Giulio Douhet. Clausewitz, who wrote On War in the aftermath of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, attempted to establish the nature and characteristics of conflict. He did this by describing the complex and unpredictable manner in which real-world events unfold, taking into account both the frailties of human nature and complexity of the physical and psychological worlds.

Nevertheless, for much of the 19th and 20th centuries, war and conflict fit generally within the Clausewitzian concept that calls for state policy to choose a form of war consistent with national goals and the political-economic situation. Maritime and air power theorists were generally consistent with this approach but there were distinct differences. Douhet, an early air power theorist, believed that a quick victory could be achieved by attacking enemy vital centres thus breaking their collective will to continue to fight. Corbett, an early maritime power theorist, used Clausewitz’s theories to develop his own arguments for maritime warfare. Corbett was critical of Clausewitz’s notion of concentration of force, which he considered to be land centric and not workable in the maritime context. In many ways, Corbett’s approach to maritime theory was based on the writings of Sun Tzu more than Clausewitz.

0224. The theories articulated in these early contributions to the literature were exemplified by the two major world wars of the 20th century. The two world wars often are characterized as unlimited and resulted in the unconditional surrender of the defeated side as governments marshalled the entire resources of the nation to achieve national objectives. Often characterized as “total war,” this warfare on a grand scale is unlike the contemporary version of warfare in the early part of the 21st century. General Charles Krulak, US Marine Corps, simplifies the modern battlespace with an analogy of a three-block war where soldiers must be able to conduct stability operations concurrently with combat operations and humanitarian operations within the same limited operating area. For the modern military professional, the battlespace today lacks the clarity and concrete definition of the last century and demands a much broader understanding of both the spectrum of conflict and the society in which the conflict is resident.

The levels of conflict

0226. The levels of conflict provide a strategic framework for the planning and conduct of military campaigns and operations, as illustrated at Figure 2-2. Military responses and activities at each level of conflict must be consistent with the national strategy. Each level is defined by the outcome intended,

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9 On War, by General Karl von Clausewitz, was originally published in German by Dümmlers Verlag, Berlin, in 1832. It has since been translated into virtually every major language.
not by the level of command or the size of the military forces involved. While the levels of conflict are hierarchical in nature, there is no sharp delineation in the boundaries between them. This often results in a blurring of the levels of conflict.

0227. There are four levels of conflict: the national (or grand) strategic, the military strategic, the operational, and the tactical. They are defined as follows:

a. **National strategic** is the level where the nature and quantity of a country’s resources dedicated to achieving national policy objectives are determined by the political leadership. It is at this level that the coordination of all instruments of national power occurs and military-political aims are established.

b. **Military strategic** is the strategic level is where military strategic goals consistent with the desired national policy end state of a conflict are determined. At this level, military strategies are formulated, resources allocated, and political constraints established. Military actions at the strategic level are frequently joint.

c. **Operational** is the level that links the military strategic and tactical levels. At the operational level, major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained, to accomplish...
military strategic goals. Tactical events are coordinated in sequence by operational staffs and resources allocated in order to achieve operational objectives.

d. **Tactical** is the level where battles and engagements are planned and conducted. Activities focus on integrating and applying the operational functions (Command, Act, Sense, Shield and Sustain)\(^{10}\) to achieve specific objectives within an established timeframe.

### The categories of military operations

0228. In addition to the classification of conflict into levels, military operations are broadly grouped into two main categories: war and operations other than war. The categories overlap, as illustrated at Figure 2-3, against a theoretical spectrum of conflict and represent the national strategic response to a particular security situation.

a. **War.** When other instruments of national power, i.e. diplomatic, informational, and economic, are unable or considered inappropriate means for achieving national security objectives or protecting national interests, nations may opt to conduct sustained combat operations to achieve strategic aims. These operations are categorized as war and can range from small to large-scale engagements and be either single or joint environment in nature. The intent of war is to force or coerce a nation or nations to officially recognize another nation’s national objectives through the means of employment of armed force\(^{11}\).

b. **Operations other than war.** Military operations that focus on deterring war, promoting peace or supporting national development goals are referred to as “operations other than war” (OOTW). The term encompasses a wide range of activities where the military is used for purposes other than fighting wars, but may include limited combat operations. Examples of OOTW include, but are not limited to: counter-narcotics, interdiction operations, arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), humanitarian assistance / disaster relief operations and stability activities.

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\(^{10}\) See *Future Army Capabilities*, Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts Report 01/01, January 2001

\(^{11}\) War may or may not include a formal declaration of war and is usually between states.
Campaign themes

0229. To facilitate planning for CF operations, campaign themes have been developed as a tool for joint commanders and their staffs to identify the predominant type of military activities to be conducted at any time within a joint operations area (JOA). Campaign themes also allow the predetermination of force requirements when designing joint operations, including the identification of principles and rules of engagement (ROE) that will govern the campaign.

0230. Campaign themes should indicate a commander’s intent with respect to the use of force while providing general guidelines for the conduct of the campaign. This has implications for force structures, resource allocation, force protection, and the tactical tasks assignment. Each campaign will have a differing set of basic ROE, guidance for force employment, and desired end state. For CF operations, there are four major campaign themes: peacetime military engagement (PME); peace support operations (PSO); counterinsurgency operations (COINOPs); and major combat operations (MCO).

The continuum of operations

0231. The continuum of operations embraces the concept of campaign themes and encompasses both war and operations other than war as shown as Figure 2-4. War is characterized by military operations where the use or threatened use of force is essential to accomplish a mission. OOTW are defined as military operations where, while weapons may be present, their purpose is primarily for self-defence. The use of force in operations is controlled by established ROE.

0232. The continuum of operations allows joint task force (JTF) commanders and staffs to adapt campaign themes as the situation within the area of responsibility (AOR) dictates and allows a seamless transition from one set of operating principles to another. For example, if the JTF was mission-tailored and deployed initially for a PSO, and the situation once in the AOR is assessed to have evolved into a COINOP, the JTF commander can request a change in the ROE based upon this assessment, as well as the additional force requirements consistent with COINOPs. This allows for a seamless transition in force postures to take place thereby avoiding the traditional incremental buildup of forces approach. The result is a more rapid response to changing operating conditions within the AOR while allowing the JTF commander to manage the situation proactively rather than reactively.

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12 The converse is true as well, i.e. initial campaign planning was for a COINOP and the situation once deployed within the AOR is assessed to have evolved into a PSO.
Constraints on the use of military power

0233. There are a number of ways that constraints may be imposed on the use of military power to moderate or limit the execution of assigned mandates. Some of these constraints are self-imposed limitations compliant with ethical, moral, or political considerations, while others are based upon legal requirements derived from the law of armed conflict. Coupled with these constraints are physical limitations on military power that are unique to the operating environments or circumstances in which armed forces are employed.

0234. Political constraints are usually imposed prior to commencement of operations and may include items such as restrictions on the type of military targets, specific guidance on the type of weaponry and munitions to be employed, geographic considerations on the theatre of operations, and politically-mandated tactical objectives for armed forces. It is rare that a conflict will be unlimited in nature. Political constraints and physical limitations will almost always be present and military commanders must be aware of them at the outset and plan accordingly.

0235. Military constraints are those that are inherent in the force structure of national armed forces or are imposed by the need for interoperability during combined operations. The nature of warfare in the 21st century is characterized by short-notice deployments that necessitate the preparation and training of armed forces in a high state of operational readiness with existing equipment and resources. Lessons learned during continued hostilities over extended periods of time, can lead to the development of new platforms, sensors, and weapons.
0236. Physical constraints result from the physical environment in which armed conflict occurs. This can place severe limitations on the conduct of military operations. Limitations caused by physical features can be overcome by the use of military doctrine and tactics such as the bridging of rivers and the blockading of port approaches. Climate can also have a major effect on military operations and must be taken into account through the development of applicable doctrine and operating procedures.

International law

0237. Legal constraints are a codification of the customs and moral proscriptions on conflict that have existed in some form since medieval times and have been updated to take into account modern weapon systems and platforms, military organizations, and concepts. These rules, to which Canada is a party, form a unique body of international law that governs inter-state conflict. International law is concerned with issues such as nationality, the legality of the use of armed force, and the human rights of individuals.

The law of armed conflict

0238. The law of armed conflict (LOAC) is the body of international law that governs the conduct of hostilities during an armed conflict. The LOAC is often referred to as the “law of war” or “international humanitarian law.” The LOAC, considered in its broadest sense, determines the circumstances where states may have a legal basis to resort to the use of armed force and the manner in which they may conduct hostilities. It safeguards the fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of an enemy, namely, prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians. It also delineates the legal limitations on nation states for the use of force that results in collateral damage amongst civilian populations and defines the rights and obligations of combatants.

0239. The LOAC has three primary underlying concepts:

a. **Military necessity.** Military necessity is defined as the principle whereby a belligerent has the right to apply any measures that are required to bring about the successful conclusion of a military operation and that are not forbidden by the LOAC. The concept of military necessity justifies the application of force (the means) within the bounds of international law and to the extent necessary, to achieve the purpose of armed conflict (the ends).

b. **Humanity.** Humanity, as an implicit part of the concept of military necessity, forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction, not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.

c. **Chivalry.** Chivalry is the conduct of armed conflict in accordance with certain recognized formalities and courtesies. The concept is reflected in specific prohibitions of warfare such as the misuse of enemy flags of truce.

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13 International law is a system of rules and principles, created primarily by nation states, which includes almost every facet of inter-state relations among sovereign states. (B-GJ-005-104/FP-021 Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, para 102.1)

14 As defined in B-GJ-005-104/FP-021 Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, p. GL-10.
0240. Compliance with the LOAC prevents the degeneration of conflicts into brutality and savagery and facilitates the restoration of a state of peace. Although it applies with equal force to both sides in a conflict and imposes specific obligations on all members of armed forces, not all parties to a conflict will follow the rules. Undisciplined military forces, insurgents, or terrorists may neither understand nor have any regard for the LOAC, and they will engage in activities that are in direct contravention to them to achieve their goals. These unlawful actions in no way relieve members of the CF from their specific obligations within the LOAC. CF commanders at all levels are responsible to ensure that their subordinates comply with those obligations, which lead to the subsequent issue of specific ROE to guide the forces under their command.

Rules of engagement

0241. ROE delineate the circumstances and limitations under which armed force may be applied throughout the range of military operations. They are formulated as permissions and prohibitions and are considered as lawful orders and not guidelines for interpretation. They must take into account all political, military, physical, and legal constraints ensuring that forces are not left vulnerable to attack or inadvertently harm political or operational imperatives. They must be developed in concert with operational commanders, including coalition commanders, and be neither too restrictive nor too permissive to allow effective and efficient operations and achievement of the aim. ROE must coordinate the use of force appropriate to the mission assigned, ensure compatibility amongst potentially dissimilar partners, and ensure that military operations meet political objectives.

Use of force

0242. The CF is an instrument of national power. Therefore, its deployment on operations and the force it may use are controlled by, and subject to the authority and direction, of the Canadian Government. The Canadian Government, military commanders and all other members of the CF are subject to national and international law. Both national and international law require that any use of force by the CF must be controlled and limited to the extent that is proportional, reasonable, and necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives.\(^\text{15}\)

\(^\text{15}\) CFJP 5.1 Use of Force in CF Operations dated August 2008
The true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to attain this.


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**The War of 1812 – Strategy at Work**

From a strategic standpoint, the Americans wanted to exploit Canada's main weakness: its relatively sparse population dispersed along a narrow strip bordering the United States, from present-day Windsor, Ontario, to the mouth of the St. Lawrence. If they were able to cut off this strip permanently, west of Montreal or in Upper Canada, everything to the west would be isolated. To do so, they would launch four simultaneous attacks. The most powerful army, consisting primarily of regular troops, would attack Montreal, while the three other armies, which were more modest in size and consisted essentially of militiamen, would invade Upper Canada. The idea was certainly a good one, but nobody appears to have realized that it would require proper organization to succeed.

From the outset, it appeared obvious that the Americans were very poorly prepared, both politically and militarily, to carry out the grand designs of the War Hawks. In Canada, on the other hand, they were awaited with considerable resolve. In Quebec the staff formed a centre of strategic and tactical planning for specialist officers supervised by the Governor General, himself a senior officer in the regular army. The soldiers may have been few in number, but, unlike the Americans, they were very well trained and disciplined in the severe manner typical of the British army.

The British strategy was simple. In Upper Canada, the troops commanded by General Isaac Brock were to slow down the Americans for as long as possible. In Lower Canada, most of the troops were to be posted south of Montreal. As Montreal was pivotal to the interior of the whole country, the British staff expected it to be the first target. If, through misfortune, both Upper Canada and Montreal were to fall into the hands of the enemy, the remaining troops would take refuge in the fortress city of Quebec, warding off a siege until English reinforcements arrived.

—Canadian Military Heritage

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Soldier, 10th Royal Veteran Battalion, *circa* 1812
The nature of strategy

0301. Strategy, in its broadest sense, is the art of devising and employing a plan or process to achieve an objective. At the national strategic level, strategy is the art and science of developing and employing the instruments of national power (including the armed forces) in a synchronized and comprehensive fashion to secure national objectives. The Canadian Forces’ (CF) definition of strategy is: “the application of national resources to achieve policy objectives.”

0302. Strategies are plans, or ways, of achieving desired ends, utilizing defined means. Strategy is multi-dimensional and incorporates political, economic, military, technological, socio-cultural, legal, and moral components. The aim of strategy is to create desired effects to influence national and international events, achieving equilibrium between the ends and the means, which represents a combination of policy and doctrine designed to facilitate a coherent and timely national response to a prevailing strategic environment.

Military strategy

0303. Military strategy supports national strategy by defining how and under what circumstances the military element of national power can be used to support national objectives. It is the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation through either the application or the implied threat of the use of force. The link between military strategy and military doctrine is illustrated at Figure 3-1.

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16 The word strategy comes from the Greek "strategies," which literally means "generalship."
17 Defence Terminology Database
0304. Military strategy applies across the continuum of operations, from operations other than war (OOTW) through war. It requires the development of a strategic concept for the employment of military forces, plans for the development and preparation of armed forces for conflict or war, and provides practical guidance to commanders concerning the achievement of strategic objectives.

0305. In the past, military strategy had mainly focused upon the destruction, or threatened destruction, of an enemy’s essential war-sustaining capabilities to attain an outcome, or effect, where an opponent no longer had the ability or the will to wage war. In modern warfare, however, this aim has expanded to include direct and indirect applications of military and other national resources in operations other than war. Such applications include, amongst other things, combating terrorism and conducting peace support operations.

0306. The most significant challenge for military leadership is to understand the character of a potential or ongoing conflict in order to devise military strategy to achieve the conditions necessary to realize desired end state. To accomplish this, military strategy must include subordinate military objectives to create an environment within which strategic ends can be attained.

**Strategic planning**

0307. The application of military force at the strategic level necessitates a clear political aim, compatible military objectives, and sufficient military means to attain them. Military objectives are expressed in the form of desired end states, which are the conditions that need to be present at the end of a military campaign in order to achieve political objectives.

0308. To safeguard national security, a state must either possess sufficient military capabilities to defend itself unilaterally, or be party to collective security agreements. The force structure necessary to achieve this goal needs to be identified and capabilities that best support the chosen approach to security need to be determined. As a result of recent dramatic changes in the strategic environment, many modern states have changed the manner in which they acquire military capabilities and have embraced a capability-based planning approach to force development. This requires a comprehensive analysis of strategic military tasks, which leads to the identification of three fundamental considerations that govern all strategic planning: ends, ways, and means. The relationship between these three fundamentals is illustrated at Figure 3-2.

a. **Ends.** The identification of a clear and unambiguous objective, or end state, is the core issue in strategic planning and is called the “ends.” In a global conflict or war of national survival, the political ends will always be clear and unequivocal. These political ends will be supported by a military strategy, encapsulated within a comprehensive national strategy, designed to achieve the desired end state. If the political objectives change, so will the military strategy.

b. **Ways.** The military strategy that determines the best course of action to use military capabilities, given the objectives and forces available, is called the “ways.” Campaign planning, which examines courses of action, assigns risks, and assesses potential impact on operations, is the methodology used to employ military strategy.
c. **Means.** Military resources, or capabilities, doctrine, finances, and trained forces assigned to achieve the ends are called “means.” If additional resources are essential to the achievement of the aim, or ends, they must be identified and requested through the campaign planning methodology. Success in modern warfare requires good planning, sound intelligence, competent and capable flexible forces, good communications, and strong leadership.

![Diagram of the strategic planning process](image)

**Figure 3-2: Ends, Ways, and Means in the Strategic Planning Process**

**International defence structures and agreements**

0309. Contributing to global security is one of the three core roles of the CF.\(^{18}\) Canada has a long history of contributing to multinational missions abroad that were lead by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), and other coalition partners. In addition, for continental defence, Canada has numerous agreements with corresponding United States (US) security organizations, both civilian and military, which reflect a bilateral approach towards security on both sides of the border.

0310. **Canada-United States defence cooperation.** The US is Canada’s most important ally and defence partner. The relationship between the two countries goes beyond security issues and is

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\(^{18}\) The three core roles are: the defence of Canada, the defence of North America, and the defence of Canadian values and interests abroad.
underpinned by close economic interdependence and shared values. Canada and the US have more than 80 treaty-level defence agreements, the most important of which is the mission carried out by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD is a bi-national military organization formally established in 1958 by Canada and the US to monitor and defend North American airspace.

0311. NORAD has evolved and is currently charged with the missions of aerospace warning and aerospace control for North America. Through mutual support arrangements with other commands, aerospace warning includes the monitoring of man-made objects in space; and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America (whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles). Aerospace control includes ensuring air sovereignty and air defence of the airspace of Canada and the US. The May 2006 NORAD Agreement Renewal added a maritime warning mission, which entails a shared awareness and understanding of the activities conducted in US and Canadian maritime approaches, maritime areas, and inland waterways.

0312. The NORAD commander is responsible to both the US President and the Canadian Prime Minister. When a US officer, Commander NORAD also command US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center serves as a central collection and coordination facility for a worldwide system of sensors designed to provide the commander and the leadership of Canada and the US with an accurate picture of any aerospace threat.

0313. USNORTHCOM was established in 2002 to provide command and control of US Department of Defense (DoD) homeland security efforts and to coordinate defence support of civil authorities. USNORTHCOM’s specific mission is the anticipation and conduct of homeland defence and civil support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the US and its interests. The USNORTHCOM area of responsibility includes air, land, and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida. The commander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for theatre security cooperation with Canada and Mexico.

0314. The United Nations. The UN was founded in 1945 as a global organization intended to promote peace and security in order to avoid another world war. The United Nations Charter bounds nations to agree to practice tolerance, to unite to maintain international peace and security, to ensure that armed force is not used except in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples. Canada is a founding member of the UN and continues to support the goals of the UN as an active member by supporting UN agencies of all kinds and by committing the CF to UN-sanctioned peace support operations.

0315. UN peace support operations were derived from Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter that allow disputes, either inter- or intra-state, to be brought to the attention of the Security Council or General Assembly. The Security Council has the authority to call on the parties involved to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. If the peaceful means outlined in Chapter VI should prove insufficient, then measures under Chapter VII

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19 Chapter VI is entitled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”; Chapter VII, “Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.”
may be invoked. Under Chapter VII, the Security Council is empowered to take effective collective measures against would-be aggressors including the use of force as necessary.

0316. United Nations peace support operations include the entire range of operations from the deployment of unarmed civilian observers to the use of armed troops to force a halt to aggression. Armed peacekeepers under UN command patrol borders, monitor ceasefires, enforce buffer zones between combatants, and provide force protection for humanitarian operations for civilian populations on all sides of a conflict. The Government of Canada may commit the CF to UN operations when it is in our national interest, the conditions are appropriate, suitable resources are available, and where it is judged that the CF can make a significant contribution.

0317. **North Atlantic Treaty Organization.** Canada is a founding member of NATO and continues to support the goals and aspirations of the organization as it transforms into a regional security and defence alliance. The guiding principle for NATO is one of common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states in support of mutual security.

0318. A new alliance strategic concept was developed at the Washington Summit in 1999, which maintains the core functions of NATO but takes a broader approach to political stability and security. This strategic concept includes the following key aspects:

a. reaffirmation of the defensive nature of the Alliance;

b. indivisibility of the security of Alliance members;

c. security policy based on collective defence; military structures; and shared roles, risks, and responsibilities;

d. retention of the transatlantic link while strengthening the European security role;

e. maintenance of the minimum appropriate national mix of nuclear and conventional forces capable of providing a wide range of response options;

f. maintenance of a smaller NATO force structure at high readiness levels, featuring enhanced mobility, flexibility, and multinationality;

g. improved national contribution to crisis management and peaceful resolution of disputes; and

h. contribution to dialogue and cooperation with former adversaries through participation in confidence-building activities.

0319. In the event of a crisis that threatens the security of a NATO nation, Canada would provide predetermined forces that it maintains for multinational operations. Furthermore, should it be required, Canada would mobilize further national resources to provide the additional forces required to fulfill Canada’s commitment to the Alliance as set out under Article 5, collective defence, of the *Washington Treaty*. 
0320. The CF is also committed to provide forces for participation in NATO Non-Article-5 peace support operations as determined by the Government of Canada on a case-by-case basis.
Chapter 4
The Canadian Forces

Introduction

0401. Canada is a middle power with a proud history of contributing to global security in support of national goals. Approximately 1.7 million Canadians served in Canada’s Armed Forces during the conflicts of the 20th century and over 110,000 Canadians have lost their lives in the service of their country. During the First World War, while the population was only eight million, Canada had 630,000 persons in uniform in order to sustain 100,000 fighting men on the Western Front in Europe as part of the Allied effort. Similarly, by the end of the Second World War, Canada had supplied the Allies with the world’s third largest navy, the fourth largest air force and a field army more powerful than in the previous war.

0402. Throughout the Cold War, Canada’s armed forces protected Canadian and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) territory against armed aggression by the Warsaw Pact. Additionally, Canadian troops participated in numerous non-NATO deployments overseas, often for peacekeeping operations, under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). The principal aim of these overseas interventions was to prevent regional conflicts from escalating into global superpower confrontations.

0403. In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War led to a redefinition of the security agenda for Canada. Furthermore, the new global threats were terrorism; international crime; disease; environmental issues; and intra-state ethnic, cultural, and religious violence. An unprecedented number of international interventions increased the tempo of operations resulting in one of the most intensive and challenging periods in Canada’s military history. Furthermore, the nature of these operations, geographically dispersed and primarily coalition-based, led to a requirement for the Canadian Forces (CF) to achieve an unparalleled degree of expeditionary capability and interoperability with key allies.

0404. The period from the late 20th to early 21st centuries has seen a fundamental realignment in the global balance of power resulting in significant advances in arms control, conflict resolution, and democratization in the Third World. This progress, in the form of a reduced threat of global war, has however been tempered by a rise in intra- and inter-state conflict in some regions of the world. There has also been a rise in the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons proliferation and a corresponding threat of regional arms races.

0405. Canada’s ability to continue to contribute to international peace and stability is dependent upon relationships with like-minded partners and the effectiveness of the Canadian Government in employing the instruments of national power. Canadian interests include the nation’s economic well-being; the safety of Canadian citizens; the protection of infrastructure; and Canada’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Canada. These will continue to shape Canadian foreign policy as well as the roles and missions of the CF. Canadian strategic military doctrine must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate government priorities. Furthermore, the CF must be structured to defend Canada and possess global expeditionary capabilities and forces readily adaptable to international events in support of Canada’s foreign policy objectives. Canada must therefore possess modern
maritime, land, and aerospace forces able to undertake a broad range of missions and tasks at home and abroad.

**Defence mission and CF roles**

0406. The Department of National Defence (DND), the CF and the organizations and agencies that make up the full defence portfolio are collectively referred to as “Defence.” The Defence mission is to defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security.²⁰

0407. The CF has three major roles:²¹ defend Canada, defend North America, and contribute to international peace and security. In addition, the CF has six core missions: conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD); support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics; respond to a major terrorist attack; support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster; lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period; and deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods. To accomplish this, the CF is comprised of four operational commands (Canada Command [Canada COM], Canadian Expeditionary Force Command [CEFCOM], Canadian Special Operations Forces Command [CANSOFCOM], and Canadian Operational Support Command [CANOSCOM]) as well as three environmental commands (the Navy, Army, and Air Force). The National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) located in Ottawa, Ontario, provides strategic direction to the CF.

**CF guiding principles**

0408. The CF has adopted six guiding principles²² that have helped to shape transformation and that will continue to guide the CF as it develops capabilities and structures to meet future challenges. These guiding principles are:

- **CF identity.** Our first loyalty is to Canada. Beyond this fundamental imperative, all service personnel must look past environment, component or unit affiliations to most closely identify with the CF. The greater good of Canada and the CF will, in every instance, take precedence over considerations of service, component, or unit affiliation.

- **Operational focus.** Within the CF, operations and operational support take primacy over all other activities and considerations. This is a particular challenge at the strategic level in which departmental, corporate, and CF priorities intersect; however, every strategic decision must be measured against the effect, positive or negative, that it will have on the CF’s ability to effectively execute its assigned missions. Transformation initiatives that increase CF operational focus should be given the highest consideration.

²² CF Transformation, Annex A to CDS Transformation SITREP 02/05 07 Sep 05
c. **Command centric imperative.** Fundamental to this principle is the ability of commanders to provide their intent to their subordinate commanders in a timely fashion. This requires a CF command and control structure that is optimized to provide effective decision and operational support to designated strategic, operational and tactical commanders. Line and staff functions must be clearly delineated. Furthermore, a distinct and unambiguous chain of command that coherently integrates strategic, operational, and tactical headquarters, and elements, needs to be in place. Capabilities must be grouped under appropriate commanders in order to meet operational imperatives and a mechanism needs to be identified which allows rapid reallocation of capabilities from one command to another in order to meet unforeseen or higher priority commitments. The key to command centric imperative is the allocation of mission-essential capabilities to operational and tactical commands, formations and units coupled with the ability to rapidly regroup and retask capabilities between entities as necessary.

d. **Mission command.** The CF will continue to develop and exemplify mission command leadership as the leadership philosophy of the CF. Mission command articulates the dynamic and decentralized execution of operations guided throughout by a clear articulation and understanding of the overriding commander’s intent. This leadership concept demands the aggressive use of initiative at every level, a high degree of comfort in ambiguity, and a tolerance for honest failure.23

e. **Authority, responsibility, and accountability.** Commanders must have clearly articulated assigned authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities. Clarity is required at all levels of command and must be enunciated by all commanders in guidance to subordinate commanders.

f. **Personnel: integrated regular, reserve, and civilian.** Regular force, reserve force, and civilian personnel must be closely integrated within the DND Total Force team in order to best utilize appropriate skills and experience. This is the integrated Total Force concept.

**Core military values**

0409. Military values are qualities deemed to be essential within a fighting force for the successful conduct of the full spectrum of military operations. Military values are defined by experience in military operations and reflect the moral lessons learned from previous campaigns. They are the personal qualities that military personnel must possess to be successful in carrying out difficult missions and tasks and reflect the values of the society from which they originate.

0410. There are four CF core military values:24

a. **Duty.** The CF core value of duty obligates members of the CF to: adhere to Canadian law, to Government of Canada policies, and to the Law of Armed Conflict, at all times while executing missions assigned by the Government of Canada. Duty also demands that CF members place the mission requirements above personal considerations and obligates CF

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23 CANFORGEN 159/07 C PROG 001/07 191430Z OCT 07 - CDS SITREP 5
24 *Duty with Honour – The Profession of Arms in Canada*, A-AP-005-000/AP-001
personnel, both individually and collectively, to strive for the highest standards of performance throughout their service.

b. **Loyalty.** The CF core value of loyalty is related to duty and reflects personal allegiance to Canada and Canadian values as well as faithfulness to comrades in arms. Loyalty is based on mutual trust and requires all CF members to support the intentions of superiors and to obey lawful orders and directions. It imposes special obligations on commanders to ensure that subordinates are treated fairly and in a manner consistent with professional military values. It also requires that commanders properly prepare and train their subordinates for the tasks that they may be assigned and take appropriate action to ensure their physical, moral, and spiritual well being.

c. **Integrity.** Integrity implies a commitment to moral principles and obligations. It obligates CF members to the highest possible levels for honesty, uprightness of character, honour, and the adherence to ethical standards. Additionally, integrity demands that the actions of all CF members are consistent with established codes of service conduct and institutional values. Integrity must also be especially apparent in leaders because of the powerful influence their personal example will have on their peers and subordinates. It also charges all leaders with ensuring that all members of a unit or organization are treated fairly and in accordance with the same exacting standards of performance and conduct.

d. **Courage.** The CF core value of courage is the foundation of all other military values. It is both physical and moral in nature and enables an individual to disregard the potential risks of an action in the interests of the broader good. Courage requires a willingness to act with integrity and speak truthfully to those in authority and is governed by conscience.

**Military ethos**

0411. Military ethos comprises values, beliefs, and expectations that reflect core military values. Like core military values, military ethos is a reflection of the society from which a military force is drawn. It differentiates members of the profession of arms from mercenaries or members of an armed force that lacks defining values. It also identifies and explains fundamental beliefs about military service and defines the subordination of the armed forces to civilian control and the rule of law.

0412. In the case of the CF, the military ethos clarifies how its members must view their responsibilities, apply their expertise, and express their unique military identity. The ethos defines the Canadian profession of arms and is the essence of those qualities that Canadian military professionals are expected to uphold on behalf of Canadian society. It affirms certain beliefs and expectations regarding the military function of applying and managing lethal force. It also provides an understanding of the political and social environment within which the profession operates. Military ethos is critical to the operational effectiveness of the CF.

0413. **The profession of arms.** The CF military ethos defines the profession of arms as a distinct calling and rejects any notion that service in the CF is equivalent to employment in other areas of Canadian society. While all of the qualities intrinsic to a vocation apply to members of the CF, they are also expected to embrace the values of the nation, as well as those of their profession, in order to serve Canada to the best of their abilities.
0414. **Beliefs and expectations about military service.**\(^{25}\) Canadian military men and women distinguish themselves from the rest of society in the following ways:

a. **Accepting unlimited liability.** Unlimited liability is the fundamental condition under which all members of the CF serve. They are required to accept, without reservation, that they must carry out their missions and tasks regardless of personal discomfort, fear, or danger. Unlimited liability is the cornerstone of military service and distinguishes CF members from their civilian counterparts.

b. **Fighting spirit.** The possession of fighting spirit provides CF members with the moral and intellectual qualities that allow them to endure hardship; function in conditions of extreme danger; and approach their assigned missions with confidence, tenacity and the will to succeed. Fighting spirit is the fundamental quality required during combat operations in order to act decisively and aggressively in the application of lethal force.

c. **Discipline.** Discipline plays a major role in maintaining a high standard of military professionalism. Discipline helps build the cohesion that enables individuals and units to achieve objectives that could not be attained by military skills alone and allows compliance with the interests and goals of the military institution while instilling shared values and common standards. Self-discipline facilitates immediate and willing obedience to lawful orders and directives, while strengthening individuals to cope with the demands and stresses of operations. It instils self-assurance and resiliency in the face of adversity and builds self-control. A high standard of military discipline is generated from an understanding of the demands of combat, knowledge of comrades, and trust in leaders.

d. **Teamwork.** Teamwork is essential to operational success. It builds cohesion while combining the individual talents and skills of team members to enhance versatility and flexibility in the execution of assigned tasks and missions. Teamwork also encompasses the CF working with non-military organizations (both governmental and non-governmental, private industry, and academia) in an integrated environment, to achieve collective objectives.

0415. The Canadian military ethos is not just a statement of values, it is the essential unity of values, beliefs, expectations, and conduct of the profession of arms. The Government of Canada’s and Canadian society’s trust in the CF is contingent on the application of the military ethos and the structure that it provides to the military profession. The CF military ethos serves to shape and to guide conduct for CF members and is the standard used by all CF members when confronted with an ethical dilemma.\(^{26}\)

\(^{25}\) *Duty with Honour – The Profession of Arms in Canada*, A-AP-005-000/AP-001

\(^{26}\) More information on this topic can be found in A-AP-005-000/AP-001 *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 
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Chapter 5
Command and Control

Introduction

0501. The Canadian Forces’ (CF) philosophy of command demands the highest standards of leadership; doctrine, and training; effective decision making; and mutual trust between leaders and their subordinates. The CF culture emphasizes mission command and empowers all commanders with the authority to execute their mission while holding them accountable for the actions of the forces under their command. Commanders at all levels require boldness, initiative, strength of will, and imagination and must be highly skilled in their profession, determined, and success-oriented.

0502. To be effective, command should normally be decentralized to the greatest degree practicable in order to cope with the uncertainty, the disorder, the complexity, and the confusion that are usually present at the tactical level. Commanders must always make their intentions clear to subordinate commanders who, in turn, must make decisions on their own initiative based upon their understanding of the senior commander’s intentions.

0503. Command structures must always take into account the delicate balance between delegation and direction. Although freedom of action and application of initiative are encouraged, they must be balanced with an appropriate sense of responsibility and accountability. Modern communications present commanders with two challenges: the temptation for higher levels of command to micromanage operations at lower levels; and the risk of relying too much on communications systems, which may stifle initiative. The best response to this dilemma is to encourage initiative at the lower level of commands but provide appropriate, clearly articulated, unambiguous guidance to commanders to ensure that the higher level commander’s intentions are well understood and not open to interpretation. Given the immediate impact that tactical decisions can have on strategic outcomes, achieving the right balance is essential to campaign success.

0504. The essential elements of the CF philosophy of command are:

   a. Commanders must ensure that subordinates understand their intentions; missions; and the political, strategic, operational, and tactical milieu in which they will operate.

   b. Commanders must use only the requisite amount of control to permit reasonable freedom of action for their subordinates,

   c. Subordinates must be provided with sufficient resources to achieve their missions.

   d. Subordinates must decide how best to achieve their assigned missions based upon clear guidance and adequate resources.
Command and control theory

Today's missions differ from traditional military missions, not just at the margins, but qualitatively. Today’s missions are simultaneously more complex and more dynamic, requiring the collective capabilities and efforts of many organizations in order to succeed. This requirement for assembling a diverse set of capabilities and organizations into an effective coalition is accompanied by shrinking windows of response opportunity. Traditional approaches to command and control are not up to the challenge. Simply stated, they lack the agility required in the 21st century.

Fortunately, advances in information technologies have created a new space within which individuals and organizations can operate. Those individuals and organizations that have learned to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by operating in this new space have realized a significant competitive advantage over those that have ignored these opportunities.


0505. Command is based on formally delegated authority and is the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces. Command may also be described in terms of an array of functions associated with an appointment or as a set of activities related to those functions. As functions or activities performed by a military commander, command typically includes, but is not limited to, planning, problem solving, decision making, organizing, informing, directing, leading, allocating and managing resources, developing, coordinating, monitoring, controlling, and so on. But the essence of command is the expression of human wills, an idea that is captured in the “commander’s intent” concept. Nearly everything commanders do is driven and governed by their vision, goal, or mission and the will to realize or attain that vision, goal, or mission. As such, “command” is the purposeful exercise of authority over structures, resources, people, and activities. “Control” is inherent in command; to control is to regulate forces and functions to execute the commander’s intent.

0506. The term “integrated command and control,” embodies the systems that are used by military commanders to exercise their authority in regulating forces and functions. In essence, these systems are decision support and situational awareness systems that provide capability necessary to direct, collaborate, coordinate, and share information in the high-speed information age.

**Principles of command**

0507. Principles of command are the tenets that guide the effective management of military operations. The CF recognizes six principles of command (Table 5-1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unity of command</td>
<td>A single, clearly identified commander will be appointed for each operation. This commander has the authority to direct and control the committed resources and is responsible and accountable for success or failure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Span of control</td>
<td>Assigned resources and activities must be such that one commander can exercise effective command and control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chain of command</td>
<td>The command structure is hierarchical and must be clear and unequivocal. Bypassing levels of command in either direction is only justified in exceptional circumstances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation of authority</td>
<td>Commanders may delegate all or part of their authority depending upon the scope and complexity of an operation. How much authority is delegated, and to whom, must be clearly articulated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of action</td>
<td>Once a mission is established and orders given, maximum freedom of action must be given to subordinate commanders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity of command</td>
<td>A clear succession of command, well understood at all levels, is required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-1: The Principles of Command

Levels of command

0508. **Strategic command** is the level of command through which control of a conflict is exercised at the strategic level and overall direction is provided to military forces, advice is given to political authorities, and coordination is provided at the national level.

0509. **Operational command** is the level of command that employs forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre or area of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. At the operational level, sea, land, air, and space activities must be conceived and conducted as a single, concentrated (or joint) effort. Activities at this level link strategy and tactics.

0510. **Tactical command** is the level of command that directs the use of military forces in battles and engagements to contribute to the operational level plan.

Command relationships

0511. Command confers the authority to assign missions and to demand accountability for the attainment of those missions. The command relationships of most significance to the CF at the strategic and operational levels are:

a. **Full command.** Full command is defined as the military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services.27

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27 The term “command,” as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has full command over the forces assigned to him since in assigning forces to NATO, nations will delegate only operational command or operational control.
b. **Operational command (OPCOM)**. Operational command is defined as the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary. It does not include responsibility for administration. In the CF, a commander assigned operational command may delegate that authority but it cannot be used to disrupt the organization of a unit to the extent that it cannot be given a new task or be redeployed.

c. **Operational control (OPCON)**. The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks that are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. A commander given operational control of a unit does not have the authority to employ a unit, or any part of it, for tasks other than the assigned task, or to disrupt its basic organization so that it cannot readily be given a new task or be redeployed. A commander assigned operational control may delegate that authority.

d. **Tactical command (TACOM)**. The authority delegated to commanders to assign tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

e. **Tactical control (TACON)**. The detailed, and usually local, direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

f. **Administrative control (ADCON)**. Administrative control is defined as the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.

**Supporting and supported commanders**

0512. **General.** One of the most important issues to be addressed in operations planning is command and control between supported and supporting commanders. There is no firm template for command and control for CF operations. A supporting commander will be directed to provide forces and capabilities with the command and control arrangements specified in the directive.

0513. **Supported commander.** The supported commander has the primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by either the strategic or the operational level command. In the context of joint operations planning, the supported commander prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). In the context of a support command arrangement, it is the supported commander who receives assistance or capabilities from another commander’s force, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required.

0514. **Supporting commander.** The supporting commander provides forces or capabilities to a supported commander and develops a supporting plan. In the context of a support command arrangement, the supporting commander aids, protects, complements, or sustains the supported
commander’s force and is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander.

**Statutory framework for the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence**

0515. The mandate for the Department of National Defence (DND) originates with the *National Defence Act (NDA)*. Under the *NDA*, the Minister of National Defence (MND) is assigned the responsibility for all matters relating to national defence and additionally for the management and direction of the CF. In addition, the *NDA* assigns responsibilities to the Governor-in-Council as follows:

a. to appoint the CDS and the Judge Advocate General;

b. to promulgate the regulations for the organization, training, discipline, efficiency, administration, and good governance of the CF;

c. to declare that a national emergency exists or is imminent and to subsequently call out the CF to perform such service as the MND may authorize; and

d. to deploy the CF on active service, through an Order-in-Council, anywhere in or beyond Canada at any time.28

0516. The MND, the Deputy Minister and the CDS are responsible and accountable, in both legal and practical terms, for the use of the authorities and resources entrusted to them by Parliament. In Canada, this is expressed in terms of ministerial control over DND and the CF coupled with effective parliamentary oversight of defence programs. The line of authority from Parliament, Cabinet, and the Minister encompasses all matters relating to national defence including personnel, financial, and resource management and oversight of the conduct of CF operations. Conversely, the MND is directly accountable to the Prime Minister and to Parliament who in turn are accountable to Canadian society.

**CF command structure**

0517. The strategic command structure of the CF29 mirrors that of many other nations with a British Commonwealth heritage. The Governor General, as the official representative of the monarchy in Canada, is designated as the Commander-in-Chief of the CF and the Government of Canada provides direction to the CF through the MND.

0518. The MND carries legal responsibility and is accountable to the Parliament of Canada for the administration of the *National Defence Act*, the *Emergencies Act*, the *Visiting Forces Act*, the *Aeronautics Act* (in relation to Defence), the *Canadian Forces Superannuation Act*, the *Garnishment Attachment and Pension Diversion Act*, and the *Pension Benefit Division Act*. Under these Acts, the MND is charged with, amongst other things, the management and direction of the CF and of all matters relating to national defence, as well as acting as lead Minister for search and rescue. All decisions and

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28 When the Governor-in-Council places any component or unit of the CF on active service, Parliament normally meets within ten days at which time the Order-in-Council is debated.

29 See CF Organization Chart at Annex A.
actions taken by DND and CF personnel in respect of these Acts are carried out, either directly or indirectly, under the authority of the MND.

0519. The development and articulation of Canada’s defence policy are among the most important responsibilities of the MND. Defence policy is developed and set within a broader framework of national objectives and policy priorities that are decided by the Government as a whole.

0520. The Deputy Minister (DM) is appointed under the National Defence Act by the Governor-in-Council (i.e., the Cabinet), on the advice of the Prime Minister. The DM provides the MND with the broadest possible expert support in all of the Minister’s responsibilities, except for partisan political activities. This includes supporting the Minister in consulting and informing Parliament and the Canadian public on defence issues. To this end, the DM advises the Minister on policy issues as well as on management concerns and manages the Department on behalf of the Minister. More specifically, the DM is responsible for policy advice, internal departmental management, interdepartmental coordination, and international defence relations.

0521. The CDS is appointed by Cabinet, on the advice of the Prime Minister, and is responsible to the MND for the conduct of military operations in support of government policy. The CDS, by virtue of the appointment, has responsibility for command, control and administration of the CF as well as military strategy, plans, and requirements. The CDS issues orders and instructions through the CF chain of command, delegates authority to commanders, and assigns missions to subordinate commanders as appropriate.

0522. The Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) is responsible for force planning and development as well as fiscal management. Additionally, the VCDS is the Chief of Staff for National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) and coordinates the activities of the headquarters. In the absence or incapacity of the CDS, the VCDS will assume the role and responsibilities of the CDS unless another officer has been specifically designated by the CDS or the MND.

0523. In macro terms the CF is organized hierarchically along strategic, operational, and tactical lines. The CDS, with the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS), operates at the military strategic level. At the military operational level, the operational commands or “force employers” translate strategic objectives, roles, priorities, and responsibilities into operational objectives. The CDS directs the employment of the CF through the operational commanders. Operational support and force generation contribute forces and capabilities to the force employment structures that are subsequently employed on domestic or international operations.

0524. Specific CDS direction establishes command relationships for the temporary transfer of formations, units, and elements from one command to another. Unless otherwise specified, all CF elements or members in a theatre of operations or along strategic lines of communication, including Canadian Defence Attachés (CDAs) and liaison or exchange officers to allied forces or civilian agencies, are under TACON of the supported commander.

0525. The CDS may assign tasks relating to either of the above functions to any command, whether in a theatre of operations, along strategic lines of communication or in Canada. The CDS will also appoint a supported and one or more supporting and force-generating commands. Except where reserved by the CDS, Commander Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) and Commander Canada
Command (Canada COM) are the supported commanders for all CF operations executed in their respective area of responsibility (AOR). Other commanders may be designated as supported commander for certain force employment activities falling short of designation as an operation.

**The Strategic Joint Staff**

0526. The SJS provides military analysis and decision support to the CDS who is the principal military advisor to the Government of Canada. This enables the CDS to effect strategic command. The SJS supports the CDS in translating government direction into effective and responsive CF operations by, for example, taking part in the preliminary stages of operational planning with other government departments, CF operational and environmental commands, and the strategic staffs of Canada’s key allies.

0527. The key roles of the SJS are:

a. to provide timely and effective military analysis and decision support to the CDS as the principal military advisor to the Government of Canada;

b. to enable the CDS’s strategic level planning, initiation, direction, synchronization, and control of operations; and

c. to translate the CDS’s intent into strategic directives.

**CF command and control framework**

0528. An effective and responsive CF requires commanders to be able to plan, coordinate, and act to achieve success in operations. A mission-command approach to operations is fundamental to success. There are two fundamental conditions for mission command: the commander must have clear authority and responsibility to act and must have the necessary resources with clear authority to use them. Commands are the foundation of the CF command and control framework. Commanders of commands are responsible for, and directly accountable to the CDS, to employ, generate, or support forces to ensure mission success and have been delegated the authorities and responsibilities to do so.

**Force employment**

0529. Force employment is defined, at the strategic level, as the application of allocated military means to achieve specified objectives or effects through activities such as operations, defence diplomacy, and unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral defence activities. CF operations are concerted sets of military actions that are designated as such and are the object of specific CDS direction, resource allocation, as well as administrative and legal provisions.

0530. Force employment commanders are accountable to the CDS for planning and executing CF operations. Force employment is the primary function of Canada COM, CEFCOM, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

0531. **Commander Canada COM** is the operational commander responsible conducting routine operations, contingency operations, and rapid response contingency operations within the Canada
COM AOR. The Canada COM AOR includes continental North America (Canada, continental US [48 contiguous states and Alaska], and Mexico) and the maritime and air approaches to North America, including the Arctic Ocean. On a case by case basis (as coordinated with Commander CEFCOM and with CDS concurrence), Comd Canada COM may also command certain operations situated in the Caribbean region and Latin America. Comd Canada COM commands all domestic operations on behalf of the CDS and exercises all the requisite authorities in respect to CF domestic operations. Operations within the territorial boundaries of the continental US or Mexico are conducted in accordance with Government of Canada direction, international law, pursuant to binational or bilateral agreements, and in cooperation with US and/or Mexican military authorities.

0532. Comd Canada COM exercises command and control of Headquarters Canada COM and all regional joint task force headquarters. These headquarters include: Joint Task Force (North), Joint Task Force (Pacific), Joint Task Force (West), Joint Task Force (Central), Joint Task Force (East), and Joint Task Force (Atlantic).

0533. **Commander CEFCOM** is the operational commander responsible for all international operations with the exception of operations conducted solely by special operations forces (SOF) elements. CEFCOM conducts global operations, across the spectrum from humanitarian assistance and security to combat operations, in concert with national and international partners to achieve timely and decisive effects in support of Canada’s national interests. CEFCOM is predominantly a supported command. The environmental commands, Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) and CANSOFCOM generate troops to be allocated to CEFCOM for the conduct of international operations. The CDS specifies the national command and control relationships between allocated forces and Comd CEFCOM. Additionally, CEFCOM informs coalition partners on the command and control relationships between CF deployed forces and any coalition formation within which they are directed to operate.

0534. Comd CEFCOM is also responsible for setting the standards for joint training and ensuring that final certification of assigned forces is accomplished. This ensures that all units and personnel assigned to conduct expeditionary duties are fully trained and ready to go. The mission of CEFCOM Headquarters is to enable effective command and set the conditions for operational success by proactively scanning the global security environment; planning for evolving contingencies; engaging strategic partners; and shaping, synchronizing, and sustaining operational capabilities to achieve timely and decisive strategic effects.

0535. **Commander CANSOFCOM** is the operational commander for all special operations. CANSOFCOM is the principal source of expertise on the development, generation and employment of SOF and is responsible for and capable of responding to terrorism and threats to Canadians and Canadian interests around the world. CANSOFCOM is composed of Joint Task Force Two (JTF 2), the Canadian Forces Joint Incident Response Unit, the Canadian Special Operations Regiment, and 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron. CANSOFCOM is unique in that the command also balances operational support and force generation for SOF.

0536. **Commander NORAD** is the operational commander responsible to the Government of Canada, through the CDS, and to the Government of the United States, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), for the execution of missions assigned to NORAD. In accordance with the NORAD Agreement, these missions include: aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning.
0537. Comd NORAD exercises command and control of HQ NORAD and all NORAD regions. The NORAD regions include: United States Continental NORAD Region, Alaska NORAD Region, and Canadian NORAD Region.

**Operational support**

0538. Operational support is the action of a force, or portion thereof, which directly aids, protects, complements, or sustains the operations of another force. Operational support is provided by a supporting command either within a theatre of operations or along strategic lines of communication. Operational support is the primary function of CANOSCOM and Chief Defence Intelligence (CDI).

0539. **Commander CANOSCOM** is the operational commander for all operational support and is responsible for its execution for all CF operations. The primary task of CANOSCOM is to generate mission-tailored organizations to provide operational support. CANOSCOM is responsible for planning, executing, and delivering national operational support for theatre activation, sustainment, and termination of a CF operation. To accomplish this mission, CANOSCOM has a full range of combat support and combat service support functions including aspects of communications and information systems, health services, land equipment maintenance, logistics, military engineering, military police, personnel support, and resource management. Comd CANOSCOM commands the Canadian Forces Joint Support Group, the Canadian Forces Joint Signal Regiment, and the Canadian Materiel Support Group.

0540. The **Chief of Defence Intelligence** is the principal source of expertise on defence intelligence. CDI is the functional authority for intelligence within the CF and, having the power and jurisdiction of an officer commanding a command, is responsible for the provision of intelligence advice and the generation of intelligence personnel, equipment, and connectivity for missions spanning the continuum of operations anywhere in the world.

**Force generation**

0541. Force generation is the process of organizing, training, and equipping forces for employment. Force generation integrates four major components: force structure, equipment, readiness, and sustainability. It occurs at three levels:

   a. **Direct.** Force generation activities that provide maritime, land, aerospace, and special operations components to a joint task force capable of employing force in the achievement of strategic humanitarian, stability, and combat effects.

   b. **Supporting.** Force generation activities that provide components such as communications, intelligence, logistics, medical, and military police.

   c. **Enabling.** Force generation activities that consist of recruitment, individual training and education, as well as materiel procurement.

0542. Force generators play a vital role in generating and sustaining the forces assigned to them and reassigned to operational commanders. They also provide the CDS with strategic advice on environmental and technical matters. The primary force generators are Maritime Command
(MARCOM), Land Forces Command (LFC), Air Command (AIRCOM) and Military Personnel Command (MILPERSCOM).

0543. **Commander MARCOM** is the principal source of expertise on the development, generation, and employment of sea power. The role of MARCOM is to provide combat capable general-purpose maritime forces to meet Canada’s defence policy objectives. Comd MARCOM is responsible to the CDS for the effective and efficient operation of MARCOM and exercises command over formations and units allocated to MARCOM.

0544. **Commander LFC** is the principal source of expertise on the development, generation, and employment of land forces. The role of LFC is to provide combat-capable land forces to meet Canada’s defence commitments. Comd LFC is responsible to the CDS for the effective and efficient operation of LFC and exercises command over formations and units allocated to LFC.

0545. **Commander AIRCOM** is the principal source of expertise on the deployment, generation, and employment of air power. The role of AIRCOM is to provide aerospace forces required for the conduct of air, surface, and sub-surface operations as well as provide an air search and rescue capability. Comd AIRCOM is responsible to the CDS for the effective and efficient operation of AIRCOM and exercises command over formations and units allocated to AIRCOM.

0546. **Commander MILPERSCOM** is assigned functional authority by the CDS and is the principal source of expertise for: all aspects of military personnel management, including recruitment; the development of military personnel; as well as health, dental, and spiritual services. As the manager of the centralized and single Canadian Forces Personnel Management System, Comd MILPERSCOM is one of the CF’s primary integrators and is responsible for optimizing the production of personnel for operations, regardless of operational command, environment, component, military occupation, career field, or branch. As such, Comd MILPERSCOM sets standards for military personnel management and personnel generation; issues functional direction, advice and guidance; and creates a management framework whereby the CDS and DM can hold senior commanders as well as military and civilian advisors across the organization accountable for compliance. Comd MILPERSCOM exercises command over all formations, units, and other elements allocated to MILPERSCOM.
Chapter 6
Canadian Approach to Operations

Operation JUBILEE – A Costly Lesson in Joint Operations

The raid across the English Channel on 19 Aug 1942 on Dieppe was planned as a “reconnaissance in force” to test the defences of Hitler’s continental fortress and the Allies’ capability to launch large-scale amphibious assaults. It was a major disaster; only the battle-hardened British commandos enjoyed some success. Troops of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division under Major-General J.H. Roberts failed to achieve any of their objectives.

The raid lasted only 9 hours; but among nearly 5000 Canadian soldiers involved, more than 900 were killed and 1874 taken prisoner. Two Canadians, the Honourable Captain J.W. Foote of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and Lieutenant-Colonel C.C. Merritt, commanding officer of the South Saskatchewan Regiment, received the Victoria Cross.

In the air battle the Allies lost 106 aircraft and 81 airmen. German casualties were light, although they could ill afford the loss of 48 aircraft. For the Allies, the raid did provide valuable experience for subsequent amphibious assaults in North Africa, Italy, and Normandy.

Although it has been suggested that the Germans had prior knowledge of the raid, there is much evidence to the contrary. The enemy was alert but not forewarned - and poor and overly complex planning, inadequate training, insufficient fire support, and the employment of troops undergoing their baptism of fire primarily caused failure.

—— The Canadian Encyclopedia

Introduction

0601. Although the Canadian Forces (CF) trains for and may be called upon to perform many tasks short of war, the central tenet of the CF is to have adaptable, combat-ready, deployable forces trained and willing to fight and win in support of Canadian government interests. A warrior ethos coupled with a willingness of all members to engage, when necessary, in combat operations in pursuit of legitimate national interests, underpins CF military doctrine.
0602. The CF must be capable of conducting joint domestic operations that require a mix of defensive and offensive maritime, land, air, and special forces capabilities. In addition, the CF will be required to operate in combination with allied or coalition forces and therefore must be commanded, structured, equipped, and trained for joint and combined warfare yet still retain the capability and structure to undertake single-environment operations. CF formations and units must be rapidly deployable and capable of operating at long distances from their home base for extended periods.

0603. Although tactical components of the CF will frequently be part of larger coalition or allied formations for the conduct of international operations, the CF must be prepared to mount operations and fight together in pursuit of national interests. The ability to provide individual components of each environment to larger coalition forces may facilitate CF participation in multinational operations but must not be seen as an end in itself.

Types of operations

0604. An operation is “a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence, and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.”

0605. Operations fall within three broad categories:

a. **Routine operations.** Routine operations are force employment activities that are normally recurring in nature, can usually be planned for, and are programmed on an annual basis.

b. **Contingency operations.** Contingency operations are specific operations planned in advance of known events or events that could reasonably be expected, thereby permitting a relatively formal planning process.

c. **Rapid response operations.** Rapid response operations are those force employment activities that require an immediate CF action to save lives, reduce human suffering, and/or mitigate property damage. In the interest of achieving timely effects, planning will be reduced to its essential components; thus higher risk are accepted in planning, preparing and coordinating the operation.

Groupings

0606. CF operations may be joint, combined, or conducted by an individual environment. They may also be a combination of these categories since these categories are not mutually exclusive. These categories are defined as follows:

a. **Joint operations.** In the military context, joint operations are operations in which elements of more than one environment of the same nation participate. The CF frequently operates jointly, i.e. CF aerospace forces routinely operate with either the maritime or land forces in a joint manner.

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30 *Defence Terminology Bank*, Record 1053.
b. **Combined operations.** Operations that involve the forces of more than one nation acting together to accomplish a single mission are referred to as combined operations.\textsuperscript{31} Allied, coalition, and United Nations-mandated operations are all considered to be combined operations. Depending upon the scope of a mission, a combination of maritime, land, and air components, logistics, and communications support may all be included in a combined operation. Nations normally contribute to the combined headquarters staff and operational components in accordance with alliance agreements or as agreed at meetings among troop contributing nations.

c. **Single-environment operations.** These are operations undertaken by the forces of an individual environment.

0607. Although the CF may conduct any or all of the groupings of operations defined above, operations in the future battlespace will be inherently joint and combined in nature. Consequently, CF doctrine is based on the requirement for the CF to be capable of operating effectively in joint and combined operations. The basic formation that will conduct joint or combined operations is defined as a task force (TF).

**Task forces**

0608. A TF is defined as a temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission.\textsuperscript{32} The TF concept provides a generic descriptor for a force of any size and composition ranging from a sub-unit to a formation. It can be employed across the range of operations and at any level of war. Any formation created for a military operation, regardless of size, is considered a task force.

0609. A TF is always a mission-specific formation. It may or may not contain elements of two or more environments of the CF. If the task force is multi-environment in composition, then it is designated as a joint task force (JTF).

**Campaign planning**

0610. A campaign is a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and aerospace forces.\textsuperscript{33} Under some circumstances military campaigns may also be concerned with multinational objectives.

0611. Campaign planning is concerned with: defining the conditions that determine success, translating strategies into a military end state, assigning operational level command, imposing limitations, and allocating resources. Campaign planning has historically been confined, as far as is practicable, to the operational level and is the responsibility of the designated JTF commander. In an increasingly complex and interconnected global theatre, tactical actions can quickly have positive or

\textsuperscript{31} The term “multinational operation” may also be used to describe this type of operation. The two are used interchangeably in this publication.

\textsuperscript{32} Defence Terminology Bank, Record 1457.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., Record 18743.
negative strategic impact. This phenomenon has caused a further compression or overlap of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

0612. The key principles of campaign planning are:

a. Campaigns should be kept simple and have a clearly defined military end state.

b. The command structure must define overall command responsibility as well as command authorities for each phase of a campaign or operation.

c. The organization of subordinate forces and command relationships must be clearly established.

d. Subordinate commanders must be provided with the JTF commander’s intent, direction, operational focus, concepts of operations, sustainment arrangements, and major tasks.

e. Preparations must be tailored to the circumstances of the operation, including training on issues such as religious, cultural, legal, and political considerations in the theatre of operations.

f. Commanders must be permitted to make the timely decisions that are required to accomplish the mission’s objectives (i.e. mission command).

0613. The campaign plan provides the framework within which operations are planned and executed. It should describe the strategic end state, the overall concept and intent of the campaign, the enemy’s operational centres of gravity, lines of operations, decisive points, and operational objectives essential to success. It provides guidance for developing the operational level plans and orders.34

0614. Increasingly, the activities of armed forces depend upon their ability to coordinate and work with civilian agencies, both governmental and non-governmental. While military aims and objectives may be relatively easy to identify through the campaign planning process, they may not align with the aims and objectives of other organizations in the theatre of operations. Therefore, campaign plans must not only synchronize military forces and capabilities, they must consider and, where practical, support the goals and objectives of the other elements of national power and any supported local government to ensure that strategic aims are achieved in the most efficient and effective manner.

**A “Whole of Government” approach to operations**

0615. In complex contemporary crises, activities and effects from a wide range of government participants need to be coordinated. The CF contribution to this Canadian “Whole of Government” (WoG)35 approach identifies an effects-based philosophy in seeking to stimulate, wherever possible, a cooperative culture and collaborative working environment between government departments and agencies. Within this philosophy, participants work proactively and share their understanding of

34 A more comprehensive description of the campaign planning process and terminology can be found in CFJP 5.0 Operational Planning Process.

35 The Canadian Government integrated approach to crisis situations that incorporates instruments of national power: diplomacy (e.g. DFAIT), military (DND/CF), and economic (e.g. CIDA).
situations and conduct planning and activities on the basis of shared favourable outcomes in the short, medium, and long term. In its simplest form, a WoG approach invigorates existing processes and strengthens relationships at personal, interdepartmental, and organizational levels. In the longer-term, to gain maximum benefit from a WoG approach, processes and structures may need to be adapted to reflect individual circumstance and situations. A WoG approach needs to be incorporated into the emerging thought on comprehensive approach to operations which includes actors beyond government, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), local populations, and others who conduct activities and pursue objectives that have a bearing on the overall outcome.

**Effects-based planning philosophy to CF operations**

0616. An effects-based approach to planning recognizes the requirement to employ the military instrument of power in harmony with diplomatic and economic efforts to find a long-term solution to a crisis. An effects-based philosophy deals with the situation as a whole and the changes that need to be made to physical and cognitive elements to secure a favourable outcome. Commanders need to assess the impact of their decisions and actions on the will, understanding, and capability of all participants, not merely the impact on the adversary. Effects-based thinking takes into consideration the physical and non-physical effects during all aspects of an operation (e.g., planning, preparations, execution, and assessment). Intermediate layers, called “effects,” exist between high-level objectives and physical actions. Effects-based thinking is a tool in support of the operational art, which links tactics to strategic aims.

| It is CF policy that all doctrine be consistent to the maximum extent possible with the doctrine of principal allies. The objective is to manage interoperability relationships to permit seamless operational integration at short notice. |

**Considerations for joint and combined operations**

**Interoperability**

0617. Interoperability is fundamental to the conduct of joint and combined operations. It resolves differences and removes obstacles to the effective functioning of forces in a multinational and/or multi-service environment. These obstacles are commonly caused by misunderstandings over: mission objectives and priorities, different rules of engagement or national caveats, different types of equipment, or similar equipment with different specifications. Other obstacles to interoperability concern differences in: doctrine, level and quality of training, and military culture.

0618. There are four key elements to interoperability: technical, training, doctrinal, and procedural. Technical interoperability is the ability of systems to provide information and services to, and accept information and services from, other systems, and to use the information and services so exchanged. Doctrinal interoperability is the ability of joint and combined forces to work together on military operations toward the achievement of common objectives. Both are enabled through the formulation of procedures and appropriate training. When forces are interoperable, the technology, the training, the doctrine, and the procedures they use are coordinated to allow them to function together effectively.
0619. Given the nature of the CF and its international commitments, all doctrine should be consistent, to the maximum extent possible, with the doctrine of its principal allies. Strong military-to-military relationships between the CF and its principal allies will ensure effective operational integration in areas such as doctrine and information networks.\(^{36}\) A key CF objective is to be fully interoperable with the United States (US) and to have compatible doctrine with other key allies.

0620. In modern operations, interoperability may also be necessary with other government and non-government organizations when operating in a comprehensive approach environment. This consideration would be included as part of the planning philosophy to CF operations.

**Combined and coalition operations**

**Combined operations**

0621. The tradition of contributing to coalitions is firmly rooted in Canadian history. Operating with nations in support of common interests and shared values has increasingly become the modus operandi of the international community in the 21\(^{st}\) century. In the multi-polar world of the future, it is highly likely that Canada will continue to act as a member of a coalition force under the auspices of international organizations.

0622. Coalitions are normally formed within a lead nation concept, and this lead nation will be designated early on in the process. Such a lead nation has the will, capability, competence, and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation.\(^{37}\)

0623. Coalition operations are usually authorized by a mandate recognized under international law originating with the United Nations Security Council or a similarly authoritative body. The recognized authority will initiate or approve the coalition activity and define overarching objectives as well as the desired end state.

0624. The designated lead nation must be willing and capable of assuming the leadership role and able to build consensus on the coalition’s political objectives. The lead nation also is responsible to present the coalition’s proposed course of action to the international community, harmonize the coalition’s planning and execution phases, and carry out the anticipated operation. Above all, a lead nation must be a politically acceptable choice for the other coalition partners.

0625. The lead nation will coordinate or provide communications and information management structures and will normally provide the coalition commander. Partners in the coalition must be brought in early during the planning process to interact continuously in order to anticipate and solve interoperability issues such as a lack of compatibility in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architectures.

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36 These information networks are commonly referred to as “command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” (C4ISR).

37 The lead nation concept has been established by the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC), of which Canada is a member. A draft White Paper, the “MIWG Report to Multinational Interoperability Council – Topic: The Lead Nation Concept in Coalition Operations,” December 20, 2000, defines and examines the concept as it applies to multinational coalition military operations.
0626. The development of strategic guidance is a key consideration for coalition operations. One of the major functions of the lead nation is to create mechanisms for consultation in order to achieve political consensus amongst coalition members and between the coalition and the recognized international authority. This process must produce strategic level guidance so that the coalition commander may proceed with operational planning. This guidance should define the coalition’s objectives and overall political-military framework and should include parameters for the planning and execution of operations. It should also specify the scope of the coalition’s mandate and any constraints to coalition operations.

0627. The reason for establishing a coalition operation is usually to accomplish an objective that a single nation would have difficulty achieving unilaterally for either political or military reasons. Contributions to a coalition operation are not judged solely upon the capability of the forces provided but also by the full range of political and military benefits that participating nations bring to the alliance or coalition as a whole. Political advantages include: sharing political risks; reinforcing legitimacy; demonstrating economic, diplomatic, military, or political support to other regions; and influencing national and international opinion. Military advantages include: addition of both depth and breadth to a force; providing access to national or regional logistic resources; and, in certain circumstances, sharing valuable information and intelligence.

0628. Coalition operations pose a number of key organizational challenges that impact military effectiveness. To be effective, a coalition operation requires integrated C4ISR system architectures that share, integrate, manipulate and display data from a number of multinational and national sources and logistics systems that acknowledge national responsibilities for support while catering to coalition requirements. Command of coalitions can lead to longer response times than purely national command arrangements, with numerous national constraints and caveats that need to be taken into account, which reduces the timeliness and efficiency of decision making. Common doctrine and procedures, in combination with realistic training, can help to counteract these detrimental effects and improve response time and efficiency of coalition operations.

0629. There are, however, potential risks in participating in coalition operations. For instance, divergent national interests, differences in force capabilities, and deficiencies in interoperability may affect the multinational force’s efficiency. Other possible risks include: mission creep that can result from imprecise mandates and unclear objectives and logistical problems, which are caused by national logistics systems that cannot be integrated efficiently.

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization operations**

0630. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established as a mutual defence organization to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through the use of combined political and military means. NATO was established in 1949 by the *North Atlantic Treaty* signed in Washington and initially included the US and Canada, and those European nations that were not under the control of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Since its establishment, NATO has had several rounds of enlargement and the current membership is 26 nations plus associated partner and dialogue nations in Eastern Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East.
The heads of state and government participating in the NATO Council meeting held in Washington, D.C. in April 1999, adopted a new *Alliance Strategic Concept*\(^\text{38}\) that includes the following five primary strategic tasks:

a. **Security.** To provide for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based upon the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

b. **Consultation.** To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the *Treaty*, as an essential transatlantic forum for allied consultations on any issues that affect national vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

c. **Deterrence and defence.** To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the *Treaty* i.e. an attack upon one NATO nation is considered an attack upon all.

d. **Crisis management.** To stand ready, in conformity with Article 7 of the *Treaty*, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations (CROs). Military activities during peacetime and conflict can be classified as non-Article 5 CROs. Peacetime activities can occur in any country. Examples of peacetime activities include: disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, counter-narcotics operations, support to law enforcement, military training exchanges, and multinational exercises. Conflict usually occurs outside a contributing forces’ home country. Examples of conflicts include: limited attacks, raids, force protection, shows of force, support to insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Military forces can conduct Article 5 and non-Article 5 CROs simultaneously, within the same theatre.

e. **Partnership.** To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, including the Mediterranean and the Middle East, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence, and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

The response to an armed attack on the territory of one of the member states of the Alliance is articulated within Articles 5 and 6 of the *Treaty*. However, Alliance security interests are also affected by other risks of a wider nature, including terrorism, sabotage, organized crime, or disruption in the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts or natural disasters, also impacts the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. As a result, arrangements exist for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the *North Atlantic Treaty* and allow member nations, where appropriate, to consult and coordinate efforts in response to these growing types of threats.

\(^{38}\) *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, Washington Summit – 1999
Crisis management efforts have become the major focus of the Alliance in the 21st century. The purpose of crisis management is to minimize the risk of escalation of crises through the mechanism of consultation and mutual action. In the event of a crisis that could potentially jeopardize Euro-Atlantic stability, the Alliance’s military forces may be called upon to conduct non-Article 5 CROs. Additionally, NATO military forces may also be used to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security by conducting operations in support of other international organizations, such as the United Nations, complementing and reinforcing political actions within a broad approach to regional security.\textsuperscript{39}

United Nations operations

0634. The United Nations (UN) usually conducts operations that are described as peace support operations (PSOs). PSOs are generally multinational operations mounted in response to international crises. Although the UN usually conducts PSOs, regional security organizations, such as NATO, the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS), or the African Union (AU) may act as a sponsor to conduct PSOs under the auspices of a UN Security Council resolution.

0635. A PSO, whether UN-led or undertaken by another entity with the authorization of the Security Council, is composed of five principal activities:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Conflict prevention} includes structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into deadly violence. It entails confidence building measures including: early warning, based on information gathering; informal or formal fact-finding; preventive deployment; or the creation of demilitarised zones. Strategies for prevention fall into two categories: operational prevention, which refers to measures applicable in the face of an immediate crisis, and structural prevention, which consists of longer-term measures to ensure that crises do not arise or, if they do, that they do not recur.

\item \textbf{Peacemaking} generally addresses conflicts in progress. It involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through such peaceful means as those set out in Chapter VI of the \textit{UN Charter}. The Security Council or the General Assembly may call upon the UN Secretary-General to exercise his or her “Good Offices” to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. The Secretary-General may also undertake independent peacemaking initiatives by offering to act as an independent intermediary to parties to resolve conflicts in a peaceful way. Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organizations, or the UN, or they may be unofficial and non-governmental groups. Peacemaking may even be the work of a prominent personality, working independently.

\item \textbf{Peacekeeping} has evolved rapidly from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars to a complex model incorporating many elements (military, police, and civilian) working together to help lay

\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{39} This approach to a broader regional security mandate has been illustrated in recent NATO-led operations in both Afghanistan (security operations in support of reconstruction efforts) and Pakistan (humanitarian relief following a devastating earthquake).
the foundations of a sustainable peace. Although peacekeeping is not mentioned at all in the *UN Charter*, it has often been referred to as a Chapter VI activity. However, in recent years, the Security Council has introduced the practice of invoking Chapter VII of the *UN Charter* when authorizing the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations or mandating them to perform certain tasks, such as the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

d. **Peace enforcement** is undertaken under Chapter VII of the *UN Charter* (specifically, Article 42) and may include the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. Under Chapter VIII of the *UN Charter*, the Security Council may also utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority. Enforcement action has been undertaken to protect humanitarian aid, restore order and stability, guarantee freedom of movement, enforce sanctions, establish secure protected zones and demilitarized areas, and separate belligerents. The UN has no standing army and does not have the command and control arrangements, intelligence systems, or logistical and administrative support structures required to wage war effectively. Consequently, the UN Security Council has almost always entrusted enforcement action to military alliances and/or ad hoc coalitions of willing states.

e. **Peacebuilding** involves a range of measures aimed at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, by strengthening national capacities for conflict management, and laying the foundations for sustainable peace. It is a complex, long-term process aimed at creating the necessary conditions for positive and sustainable peace by addressing the deep-rooted structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect the functioning of society and the state. In this regard, they seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions. Peacebuilding is undertaken by an array of UN and non-UN actors, including the UN agencies, funds and programmes, the international financial institutions, and NGOs.

0636. Canada has an established set of guidelines for determining involvement in UN operations (and PSOs in general). These guidelines, set out at Table 6-1, serve as an evaluation mechanism at both the political and military strategic levels to aid in the decision-making process for Canadian policymakers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guideline</th>
<th>Application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat to international security</td>
<td>It must be determined that there is of a threat to international security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political settlement</td>
<td>The mandate and CF participation in the operation will be evaluated to determine whether the arrangements are likely to lead to a long-term settlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear and enforceable mandate</td>
<td>The United Nation Security Council mandate must clearly set out the scope and purpose of the operation, and must be clearly worded, defined, understood, and agreed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the deployment of a force</td>
<td>At least one and preferably all parties to the dispute should agree to a peace support deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement to CF participation</td>
<td>The belligerents who agree to a peace support deployment must also agree to participation by the CF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure of peaceful means of resolution</td>
<td>All peaceful means of resolution must have failed before an enforcement action is implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and control structure and concept of operations</td>
<td>The mission must have an appropriate command and control structure and a clearly defined concept of operations. Both must be acceptable to Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force composition</td>
<td>The structure of the peace support force must enable it to realistically enforce the mission’s mandate. Thus the size, balance, and equipment must be appropriate to the concept of operations and mission objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding and sustainment</td>
<td>The mission must have an appropriate funding arrangement and a workable logistics concept in place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single identifiable authority</td>
<td>A single identifiable authority able to sustain the operation (usually, but not necessarily the UN) must be identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear rules of engagement (ROE)</td>
<td>The ROE must be clear and appropriate to the mission, and must be designed to remove any legal or semantic ambiguity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptable risk</td>
<td>The potential risks to CF personnel must be weighed against the potential objectives and benefits of the mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference with other missions</td>
<td>The mission must be evaluated with respect to the potential for interference with other peace support operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-1: Guidelines for Participating in Peace Support Operations

The Canadian approach to specific operations

Domestic operations

0637. The Canadian Forces must help assert Canada’s sovereignty and ensure the security of its citizens by fulfilling essential national responsibilities. The CF must also work closely with federal government partners to ensure that Canada’s territory as well as her air and maritime approaches are monitored constantly in order to detect threats to Canadian security as early as possible.
0638. The CF must be capable of addressing domestic threats quickly and effectively. While for the most part, other government departments (OGDs) and agencies have lead responsibilities in this area, the CF has a vital role to play in many instances from scrambling fighters to intercept an unknown potential air threat that has strayed too close to Canadian airspace to deploying special operations forces in response to a terrorist threat.

0639. The CF’s role at home also includes assisting civilian authorities to fulfill their mandated national security responsibilities. While the CF does not have the lead role in responding to domestic emergencies of this nature, if called upon, the CF must be ready to support civilian authorities as required. This necessitates close coordination between military and federal departments such as Public Safety Canada, as well as provincial and territorial governments. The CF must also be ready to assist OGDs for Canadian security concerns such as overfishing, organized crime, drug interdiction, human smuggling, and environmental degradation.

0640. The CF must also have the capacity to exercise control and assert Canada’s sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic. As activity in the Canadian Arctic, both on land and on water, increases, the CF will have a critical role to play in demonstrating a visible Canadian presence in this potentially resource-rich region and in helping other government agencies respond to any contingencies.

**Stability activities**

0641. Stability activities are specific missions and tasks carried out by armed forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order. The Canadian military’s approach to stability activities is normally nested within a WoG strategy as part of a greater comprehensive approach strategy. This strategy will ensure that all elements of national and coalition power, as well as regional organizations, multilateral bodies, international institutions, and NGOs are working within a unifying theme to consider and to address the full range of influences and factors in a destabilized environment. The development and maintenance of a safe, secure, and stable environment remains the underlying reason to conduct stability activities. Therefore, the focus will be on improving the capacity of the host nation government and institutions (i.e. judiciary and military) to achieve an enduring change to the environment that addresses the causes of instability. Stability activities and their associated tactical tasks play a major role in all campaign themes and will likely take the greatest emphasis during counter-insurgency operations. Canadian Forces stability activities include:

a. **Security and control.** The provision of general security and control allows the civilian populace and other elements involved to implement an end state of freedom and safety to conduct normal civic activities and to build institutions that support a lasting stability. Security and control should be the first consideration following an intervention or the completion of major combat operations, particularly in the populated areas.

b. **Security sector reform.** A key aspect of the long-term stability and development of a nation may be the restoration of the various elements of a nation’s security sector. Restoration of the security sector will require a coordinated approach with other government and international agencies. The military will have a key role in reforming/developing the nation’s military capabilities, while other non-military agencies will deal with the other key security institutions such as the judiciary and police forces. The approach is to coach, mentor, and assist in the training of national military forces and
provide them with access to coalition battle-winning assets. The joint task force (JTF) is intended to assist in the professional development of the national forces towards becoming operationally effective and capable of maintaining a secure and stable environment that permits the full development of the authority of the national government.

c. **Support to civilian infrastructure.** Ideally, the restoration of essential services (including the provision of humanitarian assistance) and longer-term reconstruction of the state’s infrastructure will be led by agencies other than the military. However, the military will have to fill the void until the security situation improves and other agencies become capable of such activities. Furthermore, the military may wish to pursue some of these tasks, particularly at the tactical level, in order to engender ongoing support from the local populace.

d. **Governance.** The provision of governance to a nation in which a coalition campaign is being conducted will ideally be carried out by non-military agencies. However, the military may have to fill the void and undertake both governance and economic activities until the security situation improves to the extent that non-military agencies can assume full responsibility. Such activities will not only assist the indigenous people to return to a normal state of affairs, but it will help to engender support from these people.

e. **Assistance to other government departments and agencies.** Assistance to OGDs and agencies will be tailored to each specific operation. Assistance could include:

1. assistance to police training in cooperation with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP);

2. the establishment of reconstruction teams in cooperation with Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Correctional Services of Canada, and the RCMP;

3. the establishment of a strategic advisory team (SAT) to advise the national government and mentor strategic planners; and

4. the establishment of other teams as required.

**Operations involving combat**

0642. The CF approach to operations involving combat is based upon an understanding of the nature of conflict and is consistent with the CF-recognized principles of war. Canada acknowledges the existence of moral and physical forces, and the significance of moral factors in conflict. This facilitates cohesion, which is what solidifies individual and group wills under the command of leaders. Cohesion allows military forces to endure hardship and retain the physical and moral strength to continue fighting to accomplish their mission. As a result, the CF uses a manoeuvrist approach\(^\text{40}\) to defeat the

\(^{40}\) B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct Of Land Operations – Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, Ch. 2: The Canadian Army Manoeuvrist Approach to Successful Operations.
enemy by shattering its moral and physical cohesion, its ability to fight as an effective coordinated whole, rather than by destroying it physically through incremental attrition.\textsuperscript{41}

0643. The manoeuvrist approach strikes a balance between the use of physical destruction and moral coercion, emphasizing the importance of the latter, to attack the enemy’s will to fight. This is achieved through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions that create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. Attacks are directed against the enemy's moral components—particularly its willpower, its military plans, its ability to manoeuvre, its command, control, and its morale. These actions are integrated to seize and maintain the initiative, outpace the enemy, and keep the adversary off balance.

0644. The physical application of violence is still critical in warfare but is conducted selectively. Rather than conducting operations against the strength of an adversary, they should be conducted against identified vulnerabilities. This approach to operations is dynamic and multi-dimensional. It requires a balance between mass, time, and space. Speed of action attempts to pre-empt enemy plans, to dislocate enemy forces, and to disrupt movement and means of command and control. Combat forces are pitted against the enemy’s strength only if this is required to hold and neutralize the opponent’s forces, or to set up the conditions for decisive action against a critical vulnerability.

0645. Where possible, existing weak points are exploited. Weak points may be physical, for example, an undefended boundary: they may also be less tangible, such as vulnerability in passage of information. They are often produced when an enemy is overextended or suffering the effects of a high tempo of operations. Exploiting weak points requires agility, flexibility, anticipation, and low-level freedom of action. Enemy strength is avoided and combat power targeted to strike at critical points (lines of communications, headquarters, rear areas, reserve forces, etc.).

0646. Using this approach, tactical battles are not an end in themselves, but only a building block within the framework of a larger campaign that uses surprise, deception, manoeuvre, and firepower to combine effects designed to break an enemy’s will to fight.

\textsuperscript{41} In the British Army and the US Marine Corps, this approach is referred to as “manoeuvre warfare.”
Glossary

Note: The definitions contained in this Glossary are derived from a number of sources. Where this publication is the source of a definition, no source is indicated. Definitions taken from other sources are indicated in parentheses at the end of each term, utilizing the following abbreviations:

- DTB  DND Defence Terminology Bank
- CFJP-1.2  Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels (B-GJ-005-104/FP-021)
- MIC  MIC Coalition Building Guide, MIC CBG

administrative control (ADCON)
Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. (DTB, Record 3289)

alliance
The result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. (DTB, Record 21750)

battlespace
Area of interest that includes the physical and moral planes, and the electromagnetic spectrum. (DTB, Record 19622)

campaign
A campaign is a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. (DTB, Record 18743)

centre of gravity (CG)
Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. (DTB, Record 324)

chivalry
The concept of chivalry is difficult to define. It refers to the conduct of armed conflict in accordance with certain recognized formalities and courtesies. An armed conflict is rarely a polite contest. Nevertheless, the concept of chivalry is reflected in specific prohibitions such as those against dishonourable or treacherous conduct and against misuse of enemy flags or flags of truce. The concept of chivalry makes armed conflict slightly less savage and more civilized for the individual combatant. (CFJP-1.2)
coalition
An ad hoc agreement between two or more nations for a common action. (DTB, Record 21755)

coercion
Coercion seeks to persuade others to do something that may not be in their particular national interest.

combined
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations, in which elements of more than one nation participate. (DTB, Record 18750)

combined operation
An operation conducted by forces of two or more Allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. (DTB, Record 3826)

command
The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces. (DTB, Record 27866)

command and control (C2)
The authority, responsibilities and activities of military commanders in the direction and coordination of military forces and in the implementation of orders related to the execution of operations. (DTB, Record 13802)

comprehensive approach
Commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation. It includes all actors that may affect the conduct of operations within a joint operating area. These actors may include: military (joint and multi-national forces), Canadian government department and agencies (whole of government), foreign governments and international organizations (e.g. NATO and UN), and publicly funded organizations (e.g. NGOs).

concept
A notion or statement of an idea, expressing how something might be done or accomplished, that may lead to an accepted procedure. (DTB, Record 3861)

counter-insurgency (COIN)
Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency. (DTB, Record 3941)

deterrence
The convincing of a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. This requires the maintenance of a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act. (DTB, Record 4068)
**doctrine**
Fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (DTB, Record 1761)

**effects-based thinking**
Philosophy that deals with the situation as a whole and the changes that need to be made to physical and cognitive elements to secure a favourable outcome.

**force development (FD)**
A system of integrated and interdependent processes that identifies necessary changes to existing capability and articulates new capability requirements for the CF. It is driven by changes in policy, actual or projected, changes in the security environment and lessons learned from operations. Force development comprises capability based planning, capability management and capability production. (DTB, Record 26344)

**force employment (FE)**
The command, control and sustainment of generated forces on operations. (DTB, Record 32173)

**force generation (FG)**
The process of organizing, training and equipping forces for force employment. (DTB, Record 32171)

**force structure**
A general term to describe the broad elements of an actual or proposed military force. Detailed force structures describe the organization and equipment of a military, while more general force structure descriptions focus on the overall nature of the force. (DTB, Record 26380)

**full command**
The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. (DTB, Record 4340)

**functional authority**
Functional authority sets standards, communicates clear expectations, issues binding functional direction, offers non-binding functional advice and guidance, consults and obtains feedback, monitors to ensure compliance with direction and creates a management framework whereby the DM or CDS can hold senior commanders and advisors across the organization accountable for compliance.
humanity
Related to the concept of necessity and implicitly contained within it is the concept of Humanity that forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes. This concept of humanity results in a specific prohibition against unnecessary suffering, a requirement of proportionality, and a variety of more specific rules. The concept of humanity also confirms the basic immunity of civilian populations and civilians from being objects of attack during armed conflict. This immunity of the civilian population does not preclude unavoidable incidental civilian casualties that may occur during the course of attacks against legitimate targets and that is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. (CFJP-1.2)

intelligence (int)
The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. (DTB, Record 738)

interdepartmental
Common activities existing between two or more Canadian Government departments for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.

interoperability
The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. (DTB, Record 32228)

joint
Adjective that connotes activities, operations, organizations in which elements of at least two services participate. (DTB, Record 4607)

joint operation
An operation in which elements of more than one environment of the same nation participate.

joint operations area (JOA)
A temporary area in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency- or mission-specific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations. (DTB, Record 27012)

lead nation
A lead nation is a nation with the will and capability, competence, and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. (MIC)
manœuvre
1. Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish a mission.
2. A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy.
3. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground or on a map in imitation of war; the operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle to cause it to perform desired movements. (DTB, Record 4717)

military necessity
The principle whereby a belligerent has the right to apply any measures which are required to bring about the successful conclusion of a military operation and which are not forbidden by the laws of war. (DTB, Record 4769)

military power
The capacity to use force or the threat of force to influence other states.

military strategic level
The military strategic level is concerned with determining the military strategic objectives and desired end state, outlining military action needed, allocating resources and applying constraints directed by political leaders. (DTB, Record 26658)

military strategy
That component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations. (DTB, Record 4770)

mission
A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. (DTB, Record 953)

national strategic level
The level where the nature and the quantity of a country’s resources dedicated to achieving objectives critical to the national security interest is determined by the political leadership of the country. (DTB, Record 27065)

national strategy
The art and science of developing and using the diplomatic, economic, and informational powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war to secure national objectives.

operational art
The skill of employing military forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre of war or theatre of operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations. (DTB, Record 33932)
**operational command (OPCOM)**
The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not include responsibility for administration. (DTB, Record 19477)

**operational control (OPCON)**
The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. (DTB, Record 1056)

**operational level**
The operational level of conflict is concerned with producing and sequencing the campaign, which synchronizes military and other resources to achieve the desired end state and military strategic objectives. Military actions at the operational level are usually joint and often combined. (DTB, Record 27067)

**operational readiness (OPRED)**
The capability of a unit/formation, ship, weapon system or equipment to perform the missions or functions for which it is organized or designed. May be used in a general sense or to express a level or degree of readiness. (DTB, Record 4983)

**operation (Op, OP)**
A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (DTB, Record 1053)

**operations (ops)**
The carrying out of service, training, or administrative military missions; the process of carrying out combat (and non-combat) military actions. (DTB, Record 27068)

**peace support operation (PSO)**
An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace-building and/or humanitarian operations. (DTB, Record 22802)

**rules of engagement (ROE)**
Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (DTB, Record 5285)
situational awareness (SA)
The combined knowledge of friendly forces, hostile forces, the environment and other aspects of the battlespace. (DTB, Record 19631)

strategic concept
The course of action accepted as a result of the estimate of the strategic situation. It is a statement of what is to be done in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit its use in framing the military, diplomatic, economic, and psychological and other measures, which stem from it. (DTB, Record 2047)

strategy (strat)
The application of national resources to achieve policy objectives. (DTB, Record 3236)

surveillance (surv)
The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means. (DTB, Record 1418)

tactical command (TACOM)
The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. (DTB, Record 5491)

tactical control (TACON)
The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (DTB, Record 5493)

tactical level
The tactical level is concerned with planning and directing military resources in battles, engagements and/or activities within a sequence of major operations to achieve operational objectives. (DTB, Record 27077)

task force (TF)
1. A temporary grouping of units, under a single commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission.
2. A semi-permanent organization of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a continuing specific task. (DTB, Record 1457)

terrorism
The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives. (DTB, Record 2738)
transformation (tfmn)
A continuous and proactive process of developing and integrating innovative concepts, doctrines and capabilities in order to improve the effectiveness and interoperability of military forces. (DTB, Record 28097)

whole of government (WoG)
The Canadian Government integrated approach to crisis situations that incorporates instruments of national power: diplomacy (e.g. DFAIT), military (DND/CF), and economic (e.g. CIDA).
Abbreviations List

ADM(Fin CS) ......................Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance & Corporate Services)
ADM(HR-Civ) .....................Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Civilian)
ADM(IE) ...........................Assistant Deputy Minister (Infrastructure and Environment)
ADM(IM) ............................Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Management)
ADM(Mat) ..........................Assistant Deputy Minister (Material)
ADM(PA) ............................Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs)
ADM(Pol) ............................Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy)
ADM(S&T) ..........................Assistant Deputy Minister (Science and Technology)
AIRCOM ............................Air Command
AOR ..................................area of responsibility
AU ...................................African Union
AUS .................................Australia

C4ISR ..................................command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance
                                 and reconnaissance
Canada COM ........................Canada Command
CANOSCOM ........................Canadian Operational Support Command
CANSOFCOM .....................Canadian Special Operations Forces Command
CBP ..................................capability-based planning
CBRN ..................................chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CDA .................................Canadian Defence Attaché
CDI ....................................Chief of Defence Intelligence
CDS ....................................Chief of the Defence Staff
CEFCOM .............................Canadian Expeditionary Force Command
CF .......................................Canadian Forces
CFD ....................................Chief Force Development
CFDS .................................Canada First Defence Strategy
CFJP .................................Canadian Forces Joint Publication
CFLA .................................Canadian Forces Legal Advisor
CIDA .................................Canadian International Development Agency
CJCS .................................Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (US)
COINOP .............................Counter-insurgency operation
comd ..................................commander
CRO .................................crisis response operation
CRS .................................Chief Review Services

DFAIT ...............................Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DM .................................Deputy Minister
DND .................................Department of National Defence (Canada)
DoD .................................Department of Defense (US)

ECS .................................Environmental Chief of Staff
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoC</td>
<td>Government of Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>international organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIMP</td>
<td>joint, interagency, multinational and public</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF 2</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Two</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFC</td>
<td>Land Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOAC</td>
<td>law of armed conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARCOM</td>
<td>Maritime Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCO</td>
<td>major combat operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>Multinational Interoperability Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILPERSCOM</td>
<td>Military Personnel Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIWG</td>
<td>Multinational Interoperability Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND</td>
<td>Minister of National Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>non-commissioned officer</td>
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<td>NDA</td>
<td><em>National Defence Act</em></td>
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<td>NDHQ</td>
<td>National Defence Headquarters</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>non-combatant evacuation operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGD</td>
<td>other government department</td>
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<tr>
<td>OOTW</td>
<td>operation other than war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCOM</td>
<td>operational command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>peacetime military engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>peace support operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RJTF.................................Regional Joint Task Force
ROE.................................Rules of engagement

SAT ..................................strategic advisory team
SCIP .................................Strategic Capability Investment Plan
SITREP ..............................situation report
SJS ..................................Strategic Joint Staff
SOF .................................special operations forces

TACOM ..............................tactical command
TACON ..............................tactical control
TF ......................................task force

UK .................................United Kingdom
UN .................................United Nations
US .................................United States
USNORTHCOM ..................United States Northern Command

VC .................................Victoria Cross
VCDS ...............................Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

WoG .................................Whole of Government